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INTRODUCTION

This article is pretty far afield from my usual areas of academic interest. I got involved in it when I had my car fixed a
number of years ago. I randomly took my car to a Sunoco station
in the town where I live. Though I was a stranger, the proprietors of the station fixed my car for about six dollars when they
could easily have charged me ten times that amount. I became a
regular customer, and I also became fairly friendly with the
proprietors.
To make a very long story short, the gas station premises
were condemned as part of an urban renewal project, and when I
learned the shockingly small amount the proprietors were to receive as "just compensation" as a result of the condemnation, I
agreed to represent them.
That case was ultimately settled, but I think it is important
for me to share what I discovered as a result of that case. I think
the reader will find it surprising, perhaps most especially the
reader who believes himself or herself already familiar with the
law in this area.
II.

WHAT THIS ARTICLE

Is NOT ABOUT

The scope of this article is in a sense narrowly limited. I will
deal as little as possible with the question: "What kinds of actions
may a government take and not have to pay anybody anything for
any damage to them which may result?" Instead, I will consider
only situations where the nature of the government action is such
that everyone concedes and assumes that the government will
have to pay someone something as a result of that action . . .
that is, I deal only with explicit exercises of the power of eminent
domain. Further, I will deal as little as possible with the question: "Are there people whose injuries as a result of the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, if any, are so remotely related
to the exercise of the power that they have no compensable interest at all?"'
I Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), (like many Holmes
opinions) contains many quotable lines, a number of which might be used to buttress at various points the analysis set out in this article. However, it will not be
cited again. This is because Mahon' on its facts presents (in my opinion) primarily
issues of the first and second types described above with which this article does not
deal. On the other side of the same coin,Justice Douglas's opinion in United States
ex rel TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943), contains many quotable lines which
might be invoked in opposition to one point or another of this article. Powelson on
its facts, however, dealt with a claim by a condemnee that, because the condemnee
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Instead, I will consider only situations where the claimant is
concededly in that pool of people which is most circumscribed,
and to which slippery slope arguments conjuring images of governmental bankruptcy on the one hand or governmental paralysis on the other 2 least apply: people who concededly have a
traditional, narrow, "real property" interest, generally either a
fee interest or some sort of leasehold, relative to land taken by
eminent domain.3 Without doubt, such people are entitled to
"just" compensation.4 It is equally clear that many of them don't
receive it.
One final introductory note: The main theses of this article
held the potential but unexercised power of eminent domain prior to condemnation by superior sovereignty, it ought to get, not the market value of the property it
lost, but a premium reflecting a claimed increment in the value of its parcel resulting from hypothetical future assembly of a larger parcel by the eminent domain
power which was in fact never exercised. The Court rightly rejected that claim,
which has little to do with anything in this article. The narrowness of the actual
issue in Powelson was recognized by the majority in Almota Farmers Elevator &
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 476 n.3 (1972). Finally, whatever
interest one might have in the rhetoric of Powelson is greatly diminished by the post1960 Supreme Court cases discussed infra section VII(B). For these reasons Powelson is not dealt with in the text of this article, though it is referenced in occasional
footnotes.
2 See the discussion of such hobgoblins in Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 597 (1954).
3 In the past two decades the puzzles generated by "takings" analysis have been
a favorite subject of heavyweight academic examination. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTiON (1977); Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Sax, Police Power]. While not explicitly separating the issues, this literature concentrates mostly on the first two questions in the text. The measure of compensation
due is dealt with, if at all, as an afterthought. Michelman, particularly, tends to
make all three of the text questions sound as if they were parts of a single intractible puzzle better left to partial payment legislative solutions. Michelman,
supra, at 1245-58. I dissent. However persuasive it may be to say that many government actions ought not to be found to give rise to takings, and that any compensation in such context ought to be through a system of part payments based on
legislative grace, it is inappropriate for the courts to apply the same analysis to
surrender the question of what constitutes just compensation for the clear victims
of core takings. This remedial issue is of a traditional judicial sort, and presents no
particularly difficult choices of constitutional policy, unless one is to accept as tenable an extreme political balancing model in which just compensation is always to be
only part compensation, legislatively determined. Such a vision is inconsistent with
nearly 200 years of judicial rhetoric, and with actual practice when only land is
taken from a fee owner.
4 U.S. CONST.. amend. V. This constitutional provision is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York,
438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).

486

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:483

are developed and illustrated by reference to a hypothetical set of
facts involving a petroleum marketing franchise business. The
special characteristics of such a business make it especially useful
in bringing home clearly and realistically the constitutional arguments and principles involved in this article. However, this is not
in the end a "gas station" article. The principles ofjust compensation that emerge are constitutional principles of general application to all condemnations of business premises, and the
implications of this generality of application are dealt with in the
concluding sections of the article.
III.

A

TYPICAL CASE

Let us imagine a man named Smith. Smith is a resident of
New Jersey who has been employed as an auto mechanic for
some years and has saved a little money. Smith wants to be his
own boss, which for many is as much a part of the American
dream as owning their own home. Smith decides to do something which is meaningfully referred to in everyday terms as
"buying a gas station business," and becoming its "proprietor."
What Smith buys, and what he will pay for it, depends upon
an identifiable market mechanism. There is an ongoing market
in gas stations, and that market provides a means of determining
what the various options that Smith has are worth, and, therefore, will cost him. First, we assume that Smith wants to run a
station which is an outlet for a major oil company, because of the
associated benefits: a guarantee of supplies, advertising, credit
card services, customer recognition, quality control of products,
etc. To end up with such a business, Smith has four general options: first, he can purchase a piece of land with a vacant gas station on it (or build his own) and hope to obtain a major
franchise; 5 second, he can purchase a going station (land and
building) with a franchise already attached; third, he can
purchase a lease and franchise6 business where the actual land
5 The term "franchise" is here used in its most widespread current sense of a
right granted by one person or corporation to another authorizing the other to

carry on a business utilizing various exclusive proprietary rights of the first, such as
trade names and trade secrets, generally coupled with various obligations on the
part of the franchisee regarding the format and quality control of the business so
conducted. The term "franchise" in this sense is now often found in statutes. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-3(a) (West Gum. Supp. 1984-1985); see also Westfield Centre Serv. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 86 N.J. 453, 432 A.2d 59 (1981) (discussing
franchise relationship).
6 The phrase "lease and franchise" is used here for the situation obtaining
when a non-franchisor is the lessor of the premises where the franchise is operated.
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and buildings are owned by some private party; or fourth, he can
purchase a lease-franchise 7 where the fee in the land and buildings is owned by the oil company.
All other factors being equal, each of these options will cost
Smith a different amount of money. Of the four, the purchase of
land and buildings without a franchise is least common, though it
might end up being the cheapest, simply because it is so risky. A
purchaser of only the land and buildings takes the chance that he
will be unable to obtain a franchise from a major oil company.
Oil companies issue franchises for their own business purposes.
For example, to prevent unauthorized transfers from place to
place, station franchises are almost universally restricted to a location designated in the franchise agreement. This restriction,
not illegal under any applicable Federal regulatory legislation, a
allows the oil company to control market saturation and both inter-brand and intra-brand competition. It is not much of an overstatement to say that any station located where a major oil
company would want a franchise will very likely already have one.
Thus, it is not clear that a suitable "land and buildings" will even
be on the market in any given community. Even beyond this risk,
obtaining a franchise from a major oil company and its attachment to Smith's location may entail both purchase and transaction costs.
At the other extreme is the purchase of the fee interest in a
gas station, with a franchise already attached. This option will
cost Smith the most money. The difference between this option
and the first option is the difference between buying a Checker
car in New York City, and buying a Checker car with a taxi medallion attached to the hood. The purchase price represents the
market evaluation of the package as an organic living whole, no
matter what an accountant says later about rough and inevitably
artificial allocations among various dissected parts.
If Smith does not have the money for a land-franchise package, there remain the other two options. Of those, the purchase
of a lease and franchise package attached to non-oil company
land is cheaper because it is riskier. Non-oil company landlords
Where the franchisor is also the landlord, many of the lease terms may be subject to
regulation under various state and Federal protective laws applying to franchise
businesses. Hence where the franchisor is also the landlord, I have used the hyphenated term "lease-franchise."
7 See supra note 6.
8 See Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2802-2841 (1982)
(PMPA).
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are not subject to the same legal restrictions as an oil company
landlord, simply because they are not franchisors themselves and
not subject to applicable protective legislation.' Hence, they may
evict at the end of terms for years, raise rents, and change land
uses to take advantage of new usage opportunities much more
freely than a franchisor landlord.
However, because of market control policies undertaken by
major oil companies, a very common pattern of ownership in the
industry involves the last of our four options: a lease-franchise
with the fee in the land and buildings in the oil company.10 We
will assume that that is what Smith buys. We will further assume
that Smith pays $25,000 for it.
Initially, we note here, for reasons that will be apparent
later, that Smith did not buy "a mere future expectation" or "future profits" ' except to the extent that all property represents
such expectations, nor did Smith buy something divided up between such intangible parts as "franchise" and "good will" along
with such tangible items as "stock." Smith bought an organic operating entity with a market value. Further, this asset that Smith
bought today Smith could sell tomorrow, presumably for the
same price. This market entity called a "going business" is as
much property, and as an asset as much representative of Smith's
current wealth, as a bond in a safe deposit box.
Our story continues as Smith devotes some years to his business. As a result of inflation, and of hard work, the market value
of his business increases. Let us assume it doubles, to $50,000.
9 See specifically id. and any supplementary state franchise protection not preempted by PMPA's preemption provision, id. § 2806, such as certain provisions of
the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15 (West
Cum. Supp. 1984-1985). See Westfield Centre Serv. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 86 N.J.
453, 432 A.2d 59 (1981).
10 Though changing economic conditions have changed oil company attitudes
about the desirability of the company-owned lease franchise station in recent years,
there are still over 50,000 of them in the U.S. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1984, at 31, col.
3.
11 The terms "mere future expectation" and "future profits" are two labels
sometimes slapped conclusively onto all forms of business loss through condemnation to render them "consequential" and therefore supposedly not subject to a requirement of compensation under the fifth amendment. Much of the rest of this
article is devoted to an attack on the tenability of such a ploy either conceptually or
under applicable U.S. Supreme Court authority. It has long been recognized that
current market value of an asset reflects in part the market evaluation of those intangible future "expectations." Market value represents a "series of annual incomes capitalized into a fund of value." Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent
Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 254 n.156 (1931) (citing R. ELY & E. MOREHOUSE, ELEMENTS OF LAND ECONOMICS (1924)).
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Because he is on a busy arterial street, Smith's business is thriving. However, there is a cloud on the horizon. Smith's station is
on the edge of a zone comprised mostly of unused railroad property. This zone has been declared blighted, and is slated to be
the site of a billion dollar urban renewal project to erect a highrise office and residential complex. Smith's station is in the project zone, and it is condemned by the local redevelopment authority using the power of eminent domain, for transfer to the
2
private developer undertaking the project.'
Smith is not happy to lose his business, but he remembers
from his high school civics class that a collective improvement
takes precedence over individual property, as long as just compensation is paid. This is some comfort until he finds out that
the law says that he, Smith, gets a maximum of $10,000 "in lieu
of. . . actual relocation payments,' 3 and nothing more. To add
insult to this injury, he is informed that even this sum is a grace,
because the requirement of "just compensation" pursuant to the
Constitution would be satisfied if Smith were given nothing. This
for an asset which he could have sold the day before for $50,000.
The reason Smith gets, at most, the statutory $10,000 is the
result of a combination of two seriously flawed doctrines. As a
result of a process of confused analysis, Smith's injuries may
likely be labelled "merely consequential" and, therefore, not
subject to compensation by the requirement of just compensation. 4 Another way to put it is that there is an almost universal
assumption that injuries to business resulting from condemnation of business premises need never be paid for pursuant to the
just compensation requirements of the fifth amendment-the assumed "no business damages" rule.' 5 Secondly, while the lease
part of Smith's lease-franchise arrangement is by statute indefinite, and cancellable only for cause,' 6 these favorable conditions
are not taken into account in dividing the unitary award for the
fee interest between Smith and the oil company. All that counts
in Smith's favor is "the difference between the market rent and
12 This is normal procedure for accomplishing large urban renewal projects. See
Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban Deterioration, 72
HARV. L. REV. 504 (1959).

13 42 U.S.C. § 4622(c) (1982).
14 See supra note 11.
15 See 2 P. NICHOLS & J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.24
(rev. 3d ed. 1983). For a classically egregious case manifesting the assumption, see

Community Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 15 Cal. 3d 813, 543 P.2d 905, 126 Cal. Rptr.
473 (1975).
16 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (1982).
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the rent reserved in the lease." 7 And since these leases typically
have "floating" rents which are reestablished yearly, limited by
the market rate as a ceiling, the value of the lease, under that
formula, is nearly always zero, or close to it. Moreover, "relocation" for Smith is a meaningless concept, since to get what he
had yesterday, he's going to have to pay somebody else $50,000,
whether it's down the street or across the state, and he now has,
at most, only $10,000.
IV.

WHAT THIS ARTICLE
MYTHICAL

"No

Is

ABOUT-DIRECT DAMAGES AND THE

BUSINESS DAMAGES"

RULE

In Armstrong v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court of the
United States defined the central policy of the fifth amendment
as follows: "The Fifth Amendment guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation
was designed to bar government from forcing the people to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole."' 19 In light of this principle, any rule
which denies a right of compensation to franchisees whose entire
business net value has been destroyed by the exercise of the
power of eminent domain must seem slightly suspect, to say the
least. Indeed, in its generally assumed form, the "no business
damages" rule in just compensation cases is virtually universally
condemned on, ironically, justice grounds.2 ° I shall show in this
article that such a rule turns out to be more than merely suspect;
it turns out to be non-existent. What a franchisee is constitutionally
entitled to, as a minimum, is the market value of whatever salable
pakage is takenfrom him by the condemnor's seizing of his lease
interest. This is nothing more than what is meant in modern
remedies parlance by "general damages" when the term is used
with any precision. 2 1 For the purposes of this article, I will refer
to these as "direct damages," however, for historical reasons
which will become apparent shortly.
As applied to this "present market value" definition of direct
17 City of Newark v. Cook, 99 N.J. Eq. 527, 133 A 875 (Ch. 1926).

364 U.S. 40 (1960).
19 Id. at 49.
20 See authorities collected and analyzed in, appendix infra. See particularly
Kanner, When is "Property" Not "Poperty Itself"." A Critical Examination of the Bases of
Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REV. 57
(1969); and Kanner, Condemnation Blight: How Just Is Just Compensation, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 765 (1973).
18

21

See D.

DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF REMEDIES

138-45 (1972).
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damages, the "no business damages," rule is not a rule, it's a
myth. Depending on how affected one has been by the myth,
carefully fostered by condemning authorities, one, will find the
following theses more or less surprising:
(1) The Supreme Court of the United States has never
failed to hold that properly claimed direct damages were the
required measure ofjust compensation under the fifth amendment. On the contrary, for nearly a century, the Supreme
Court has always required the payment of such direct damages
in every case in which they were asserted.
(2) Every U.S. Supreme Court case cited in support of
some more general "no business damages" rule did not in fact
deal with a claim of direct damages, and does not stand for a
general "no business damages" rule under the fifth
amendment.
(3) Recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court make it
clear that just compensation under the fifth amendment requires the payment of the market value of whatever salable
package the condemnee loses as a result of the condemnation.
Far from being revolutionary, this is consistent with Supreme
Court authority of over ninety years standing.
V.

THE HISTORY OF THE MYTHICAL
RULE

"No BUSINESS DAMAGES"

The progenitor of all Federal and state "no business damages" cases was Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Thoburn.2 2 This case
was so influential that later cases referred to "the Rule in
23
Thoburn's case."
Thoburn owned land with a stream on it which emptied into
the Schuylkill River. 24 On the stream he had a water-driven mill,
in which he installed machinery for the spinning of cotton
thread. 25 The Schuylkill Navigation Company was a company authorized by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to erect dams
and locks to make the Schuylkill navigable. 2 6 One of the company's dams raised the water level of the stream so that part of
Thoburn's land was flooded, and the flow of the stream on his
land was reduced to a point that it was worthless as a mill stream,
7 Serg. & Rawle 411 (Pa. 1821).
See, e.g., Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Farr, 4 Watts & Serg. 362, 376 (Pa.
1842).
24 Thoburn, 7 Serg. & Rawle at 412.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 411.
22
23
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and thus his mill was rendered useless.'
All parties agreed that the company, acting under delegated
authority from the Commonwealth, had the obligation to pay just
compensation, as required by the Pennsylvania Constitution, and
as further required by statute. 28 At the trial, the company requested the judge to instruct the jury that Thoburn could recover
only for injuries to his land and equipment, and not for any damages to his business. 29 The trial judge ruled that Thoburn could
recover for any injury which was not the result of an asserted
emotional or idiosyncratic attachment peculiar to Thoburn and
allowed testimony concerning, not Thoburn's business, but the
high profits to be made in the cotton spinning business in general." Meanwhile, Thoburn had relocated his machinery to another mill and was once again in business. 3 ' No claim for
relocation expenses or profits lost while the relocation was undertaken seems to have been separately made.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the case
should have been resolved by the application of what was then
ordinary damage theory.3 2 The court found that the agency of
the injury complained of was the raising of the water level. 3 At
the instant that rise was complete, certain damages came into
existence. 34 There were the direct damages. In Thoburn's case
they consisted of flooding his land in such a way as to put some
acres under water and to destroy the value of a preexisting
stream as a mill stream. The direct damages were the difference
in value of the land flooded and unflooded (plus diminution in
value of any equipment injured by the water). Any other injuries
which accrued only as time passed, such as asserted lost profits,
were consequential, 3 5 and could not be recovered as just compensation because they could not be recovered under ordinary damage theory in 1821, even from a wrongdoer who caused such a flood.
Thoburn has many interesting aspects. First, it was not a complete-destruction-of-business case-Thoburn could relocate and
did.3 6 Insofar as he was to be compensated for the loss of a mill
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
27
28
29
30

at 412.
at 420-21.
at 418.
at 412.
at 421.

at 421-22.
at 412.
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stream and some buildings, he could apparently obtain a similar
package by rent or purchase from the proceeds. Second,
Thoburn was being a pig, and piggy plaintiffs have repeatedly
gotten courts angry in this area and made bad law. The "lost
profits" he was seeking were apparently not reduced to present
value, and even if they were, they were also in some part attributable to the value of the mill stream, for which even the court's
final formulation was already compensating him. Third, the
court saw its ruling as being dictated by the application of the
then-normal damage theory, in which damages to business such
not be recovered by anyone because they were
as lost profits could
"consequential. ' 37 In so doing it set out a formulation of the difference between "direct" and "consequential," which was perhaps harsh, but at least intelligible and uniform.
The theoretical distinction between direct and consequential
in Thoburn is not essentially different than that found today between "general" and "special" damages in the current leading
treatise, Dobbs's Handbook on the Law of Remedies. 3 8 But now
comes the truly astounding part of the story. The decisional rule
in Thoburn that consequential damages could not be recovered
was of course left far behind by damage theory over the next
hundred years 4s courts began to allow the recovery of consequential damages in most contexts. 39 However, the rule in
Thoburn was anachronistically retained in so-called "just compensation" law. Even worse, it was over the course of time applied in
a degenerate form such that elements of damage "direct" under
the Thoburn rule were sometimes labelled "consequential" in
condemnation proceedings, and recovery denied.4" The position
of such decisions seemed to have been that the measure of constitutional "just compensation" was not simply 1821 damage theId. at 422.
See D. DOBBS, supra note 21.
39 See generally R. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS (1978). On
"goodwill," see Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Eminent Domain: Compensationfor Injury
to Business, 11 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 217 & n.9 (1925). One can make a powerful
argument that "just" compensation ought to be in dynamic conformity with prevailing theories of damages in the non-taking context.
40 See, e.g., In re New York, W. Shore & Buffalo Ry., 42 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 633 (App.
Div. 1885) (denial of relocation expenses). Assuming relocatability, and no change
of value upon completion of relocation, at the moment of condemnation a rational
purchaser would pay only the previous value of the business less the relocation
expenses. Thus relocation costs are and should always have been as direct damages when a business was relocatable, at least when the business owners were also
the fee owners (thus eliminating the argument that such relocation would have had
to be undertaken at the end of a term anyhow).
37
38
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ory, but a narrowed and degenerate form of 1821 damage theory
at that.
There is a combination of factors which explains this anomaly, at least up to a point. Between the decision in Thoburn and
the beginning of the twentieth century, the bulk of all condemnations were undertaken by private corporations, generally transportation corporations such as railroads, 4 ' by virtue of the
delegated power of eminent domain which at an early date had
been declared valid in the face of attacks that the power was not
being employed for a public use. 4 2 In any proceedings that occurred, the company was the named party, an obvious deep
pocket target for the condemnee's neighbors on the jury. 43 Secondly, most condemnations were of undeveloped land in rural
areas.4 4 This fact had three ramifications: first, business property
was rarely taken; second, when it was, there seems to have been
an unstated assumption that the wide availability of land made
relocation possible with minimum transaction costs; and finally,
and most importantly, valuation proceedings were almost invariably by jury in the same small rural community where the owner
of the interest taken resided. There was widespread suspicion,
which clearly affected court decisions, that local juries gave inflated "premium price" awards against the railroads and canal
companies even under the narrowest possible legal formula. 45 In
the face of this fear, there was a great reluctance to expand the
legal standard in any way that might turn juries loose any further,4 6 no matter how just it might appear on its face, and no
matter how the general law of damages had changed in the
41 As to the relative incidence of "private company" condemnation to public
authority, a perusal of the reported cases collected at 20 C.J. EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 234 (1920) shows the dominance of private company cases during the period referred to. See also Freyer, Reassessing the Impact of Eminent Domain in Early American
Economic Development, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1263; McCormick, The Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain, 16 MINN. L. REV. 461, 492 (1933); Note, Eminent Domain
Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 66 (1957).
42 Scudder v. Trenton Delacuaro Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832); Aldridge v.
Tuscumbia C. & D. R.R., 2 Stew. & P. 199 (Ala. 1832). See generally Bennett,
Eminent Domain and Redevelopment: The Return of Engine Charlie, 31 DE PAUL L. REV.
115 (1981), and other authorities collected therein at 115 n.3, 116 n.5, and 116 n.7.
43 Freyer, supra note 41, at 1269.
44 See Comment, Some Problems of ConsequentialDamages in Condemnation Proceedings,
28 GEO. L.J. 986, 994 (1940); see also Spies & McCoid, Recovery of ConsequentialDamages in Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REV. 437, 449-50; Note, supra note 41, at 66-67,
89.
45 Freyer, supra note 41, at 1278-82.
46 Justice Douglas expressed concern over such "swollen verdicts" in United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 385 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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meantime. With a few notable exceptions, 47 the business damage
question tended to become subject to a rote formula, mechanically and uncritically repeated. This rote formula was virtually
cast in concrete by the publication of Lewis's treatise on eminent
domain in 1888, a work which set it out in the broadest terms and
failed to note such exceptional cases as did exist. 48 Unfortunately, this situation continued beyond the conditions that gave it
some justification, or at least made it understandable. By the second decade of the twentieth century condemnation proceedings
were increasing in urban areas, 49 and they increasingly were
brought in the name of public agencies whose presence in the
case made jurors think "higher taxes," not "deep pocket." Yet,
the old formula survived by mindless repetition. Meanwhile, the
law of damages had advanced to a point where in many contexts
business damages and lost profits might be awarded.5 °
VI.

GENERAL THEORIES FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF "JUST
COMPENSATION"

Ironically, the person whose business is totally destroyed by
the taking of his business premises would be happy to return to
1821 damage theory, and to Thoburn itself. In order to understand this clearly, it is necessary to set out in outline form the
various general approaches to constitutional just compensation
that have been considered by the courts and commentators.
(1) Value to the owner-version 1. This approach would give
to the person whose property is subject to an exercise of eminent
domain the least amount that, if it had been offered with no condemnation on the horizon, would have persuaded that person to
give up what he has lost. The problems of this formulation are
twofold. First, it allows for the recovery of amounts representing
the buyout of idiosyncratic emotional attachments (the family
homestead), which can be massive. Second, the amount of compensation may in a given case become infinite if no amount of
money would have been accepted in exchange for what was lost.
47 See, e.g., Chicago, S.F. & C. Ry. v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 282, 15 S.W. 931 (1891)
(allowing indirect damages); Henry v. Pittsburg & Allegheny Bridge Co., 8 Watts &
Serg. 85 (Pa. 1843) (same).
48 See J. LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 147, at 196,
§ 487, at 639-43 (1st ed. 1888). Lewis badly misconstrues Thoburn and Schuykill
Navigation Co. v. Farr, 4 Watts & Serg. 362 (Pa. 1842), as support for his extreme
version of the assumed rule. See J. LEWIS, supra, at 639 n. 1.
49 See generally Comment, supra note 44.
50

See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hall, 124 U.S. 444 (1888).
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This formulation's unpredictable and uncontrollable inflation of
what is due is the straw man knocked down by critics of all
aspects of value-to-the-owner theory. 5
(2) Value to the owner-version 2. This approach would give
to the condemnee not what he would require to suffer the loss of
condemnation, but the least amount a rational economic person
in his position would require to suffer it. This approach includes
the transaction costs of relocation and other reflections of the
special economic advantage to the condemnee of not moving,
but does not allow for idiosyncratic or emotional attachment.
This version of value to the owner has been much neglected in
analysis. It does not suffer from either the inflation or unpredictability of version 1. The only available criticism of it is that'if,
because of particular economic disadvantages in moving, the
value to the rational economic owner can be shown to be higher
than any other person would pay for what was taken, the government will in those cases have to pay more than any other buyer
52
would have been willing to pay for what has been taken.
(3) Value to the taker. This formula would give the condemnee only what a rational economic taker would pay, absent
the power of condemnation.53 The problems are twofold. In
most cases, where the government only wants ground, for example, but must destroy buildings to get it, the government would
often only offer ground value as a matter of rational economics,
while other available private buyers would offer more. In this
case the government could force a sale to itself for less than an
available private buyer would pay.54 In other cases, as where land
is most valuable only for a use which only a government could
undertake, the amount to be paid might end up more than any
private buyer would pay. 55 Nobody seriously argues for value to
the taker anymore, and the only anomalous corner of the concept
51 Thoburn considers and rejects this version of value to the owner. Thoburn, 7
Serg. & Rawle at 420, 422. Its rejection seems to have been well understood and
settled. See the instructions given by the trial court. Id. at 414. The theory is partly
accepted in Canada. See Todd, Winds of Change and the Law of Expropriation, 39 CAN.
B.J. 542, 553 (1961).
52 See generally McCormick, supra note 41, at 469. The rejection of replacement
value in United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979) was a rejection
of this version of value to the owner theory.
53 See generally Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1931); McCormick, supra note 41, at 461-67.
54 This implication of value to the taker theory was recognized and rejected as
unconstitutional in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 333 U.S. 1, 13 (1949).
55 See McCormick, supra note 41, at 461-65.
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which occasionally rears its discredited head is found in the occasional attempt to invoke some assumed doctrine that there are
elements of economic value in a condemnation setting which a
condemnor must pay for if it uses them, but need not pay for if it
destroys them.56 This statement is at odds with the general implications of the now almost universally recognized theory, the market value theory. And, of course, it is also at odds with the
universal requirement that the condemnor pay for the improved
value of land even if it wants to tear down the buildings and use
only the ground. Most importantly, it is at odds with recent
United States Supreme Court authority.57
(4) Market value theory. Market value theory is the universally accepted theory of valuation in the United States in the eminent domain setting. 58 Saying this, however, still leaves one very
important question to be resolved: What package of economically valuable rights is to be submitted to the valuation of the
market? Is it all those things the condemnee has lost that result
in a diminution in the market estimate of his net wealth? Or
should some things that are normally considered by the market
be excluded from the estimate because they are classed as
"things we don't pay for in giving just compensation" or "mere
consequential damages"?
Here we are, then, at the heart of the reason why I say that
"just compensation" law has applied a degenerate form of 1821
damage theory, and also why I say that Smith's quarrel is not so
much with 1821 damage theory as with 1821 economic practicalities. When one reads Thoburn, it becomes clear from the language that, had Mr. Thoburn had bona fide offers to buy his yarn
spinning business as a market package the day the waters rose,
and because of the damage from the waters the price the yarn
spinning business package would have fetched had fallen by half,
or even to zero, upon such proof, he would have been entitled to
the diminution in the going business package as direct damages.59
In fact this distinction, and even the propriety of using lost profits evidence to show direct market value injury, was recognized
6°
twenty years after Thoburn in Schuykill Navigation Co. v. Farr.

56 See 2 P. NicHOLS &J. SACKMAN,-supra note 15, § 5.24, at 5-296 to -298.
57 See infra section VII. See particularly Almota Farms Elevator & Warehouse Co.
v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 475 n.2 (1973).
58 Comment,Just Compensationand the Assassin's Bequest. A UtilitarianApproach, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (1974).

59 Thoburn, 7 Serg. & Rawle at 422-23.
60 4 Watts & Serg. 362, 376 (Pa. 1842).
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However, Mr. Thoburn offered no such proof, and the court
never in so many words dealt with the possibility. Why? Perhaps
sales of going businesses in the expanding United States of 1821
were uncommon and people did not think in those terms as a
matter of habitual economic conceptualization. It is not, however, because the law of damages would not have allowed such a
recovery had it occurred to somebody to prove such a loss. It is
only as a result of the very special conditions prevailing in condemnation proceedings in the nineteenth century, which have already been described, that authorities such as Lewis lost sight of
the important distinction between direct and consequential damages. This process of degeneration was reinforced by the unfortunate habit of litigants, courts, and commentators in this
specialized area of the law to speak of loss factors as separate
entities rather than as inseparable factors in the organic package
of the present market value of a business. 6 ' When one speaks of
"lost profits" it sounds as if one is in fact speaking of a future and
somewhat speculative item. The same is even more true in regard to "loss or injury to goodwill." In fact, viewing such an intangible as an entity, one may not even be able to say very
persuasively what it is, 6 2 much less what it is worth when it is
concentrated on in isolation. But that approach is rather like the
approach of the medieval biologists who looked for the seat of
life and the soul by dissection of living animals and rather predictably ended up with only dead parts. A going business has a
present organic value which is usually much more certain than
the value attributable to such isolated factors. Nothing is more
well established in the field of economic valuation than the current market valuation of a going business.6 3 While such a process
may have the same problems as any other valuation process, it is
certainly no less established and routinized, nor more problematical, than the process of land valuation, which is universally resorted to in condemnation cases when land is properly the only
61 Remarkably, even those criticizing the rule have habitually made the error
from an early point. The error is reflected in every authority collected in the appendix infra, and only one article comes close to developing the direct damages play.
See Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will and Business Losses in Eminent
Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604 (1968).
62 See Malek, Loss of Business Goodwill in Eminent Domain Proceedings, CAL. ST. B.J.
Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 35; Note, The Lessee and Goodwill in an Eminent Domain Proceeding, 8
W. ST. U.L. REV. 47 (1980). St. Augustine made a famous similar observation about
the nature of time.
63 See generally D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING ch. 1, § 1 (1966) (enterprise
valuation).
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issue. And one should never forget, as so much rhetoric in this
area appears to, that the obligations of the just compensation
64
clause are in no way limited to paying only for real property.

VII.

THE RELEVANT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS

We now turn to the jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court on the issues. In setting this out, I will divide
consideration into two parts: the pre-1960 "business damage"
cases per se, and the post-1960 cases which bear on the proper
modern construction of the just compensation clause, even
though some may not deal with asserted business destruction
losses.
A.

Supreme Court Business Damage Cases Prior to 1960

The "no business damages" rule was developed in the state
courts in the nineteenth century in a context where the particular
requirements of the fifth amendment were not thought to apply
to the states.6 5 Specifically, Federal condemnations raising the
64 Specifically, as to such forgetting, note the following sentence given by Nichols as part of one attempted rationalization of the "no business damages" rule:
"Under the Constitution compensation need not be made for purely personal
property taken." 2 P. NICHOLS &J. SACKMAN, supra note 15, § 5.24, at 5-298. How
such a line could survive in the supposed standard authority in this area in the face
of numerous Supreme Court cases to the contrary, see, e.g., United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40 (1960), raises other questions which are generally beyond the scope of this article. I will simply say that my impression of Nichols is that the work is often inaccurate in its characterization and use of cases, and almost always these inaccuracies
are slanted in favor of condemning authorities.
Two final things should be noted apropos of this. First, Mr. Nichols himself
wrote in the second edition of his treatise (1917), in criticizing a New Hampshire
case where a railroad company exercising the power of eminent domain was forced
to pay compensation for the flooding of land (Eaton v. B.C. & M.R.R., 51 N.H. 504
(1872)), that the fallacy of that opinion " 'lies in its assumption that the property
rights of an individual against other individuals are the same as they are against the
public.'" Cormack, supra note 11, at 240 (quoting 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
297 (2d ed. 1917)). As to a right of compensation, the criticized assumption is now
clearly established constitutional doctrine. See Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct.
2862 (1984); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164
(1980). A treatise based on and colored through thousands of pages by this position of its original author must be regarded as suspect. No correction to this bias
seems to have been forthcoming from Julius Sackman, who, as general editor of the
treatise for two decades beginning in the 1950's, was employed by a condemning
authority during much of that period.
65 The first cases applying the just compensation requirement to the states were
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1846) and Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 122 (1896). On the assumed inapplicability of the U.S. Constitu-
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business damages issue seem to have been quite uncommon.
The issue was first potentially before the Supreme Court in 1882
in Newport and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. United States,6 6 but the case
was disposed of on another ground. Ten years later came Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States.6 7
Perhaps never in history has a case been so widely misconstrued and cited for propositions directly the opposite of those
for which it stands as Monongahela. A recent example of this phenomenon may be found in the New Jersey case of State v. Cooper
Alloy Corp.,68 where Monongahela is cited for the proposition that
"just compensation generally does not include losses or costs
that are incidental to a taking such as loss to or destruction of
good will, loss of profits, inability to relocate, or frustration of
the condemnee's plans." 69 Nothing could be further from Monongahela. This phenomenon of misconstruction goes back at least
to the early 1930's.70 Its widespread repetition is enough to make

one wonder whether anyone has actually bothered to read the
Monongahela opinion in the last sixty years.
The facts of Monongahela were as follows: In 1836 the State
of Pennsylvania granted the Monongahela Navigation Company
a corporate charter. 7 ' Both by the terms of its charter and by enabling legislation of the Pennsylvania Legislature, the company
was authorized to build and own seven dams and locks on the
Monongahela River, to the end that the river would become navigable to vessels in excess of fifty tons in all seasons. 72 The company built all seven dams and locks, completing No. 7 in 1884. 7 3
No express "franchise" to collect tolls at the locks appears to
have been included in any of these statutes and charters, or at
least no such provision is quoted in the rather extensive excerpts
from those documents reprinted with the reported decision. The
right to collect tolls seems to have been taken 7as implied in the
corporate right to construct and own the locks. 1
tion's just compensation clause to state action, see Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 441,
442 (1874). See generally Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent
Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV. 67 (1930).
66 105 U.S. 470 (1882).
67 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
68 136 N.J. Super. 560, 347 A.2d 365 (App. Div. 1975).
69 Id. at 568, 374 A.2d at 369.
70 See, e.g., Cormack, supra note 11, at 228-29.
71 Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 314.
72 Id. at 314-15.
73 Id.at 315.
74 See id.at 344.
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In 1888 Congress passed a statute declaring that the Secretary of War was to take lock and dam No. 7 for the United
States. 75 The statute authorized an offer of $161,733.13 to be
made for the lock and dam.7 6 In the event the offer was rejected,
the statute directed condemnation proceedings to be undertaken
"as prescribed and regulated by the provisions of the general
railroad law of Pennsylvania, ' 77 which could be depended upon,
in the normal late nineteenth century state manner, to make no
allowances for "business damage." The statute furtherforbade the
payment of any
sum in compensation for the value of the right to
78
collect tolls.

Condemnation proceedings were instituted, and after trial,
the court found that the value of the lock and dam No. 7 was
$209,000 "not considering or estimating in this decree the

franchise of this company to collect tolls." ' 79 The company ap-

pealed to the Supreme Court. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, with two Justices not participating.
Justice Brewer first stated that the question presented "is not
whether the United States has the power to condemn and appropriate this property of the Monongahela Company, for that is
conceded, but how much it must pay for compensation. '"80 The
next two and a half pages are devoted to general observations on
the proper construction of the fifth amendment in such a case. 8 1
On the proper meaning of the just compensation clause Justice
Brewer quoted from Justice Bradley's opinion in Boyd v. United
States 82" constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy and leads to the
gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound
than substance." 3 Then, apparently in response to an argument
that any amount due the Monongahela Company be discounted
by the fact that the company might be benefited in regard to its
other locks as a result of the operation of lock No. 7 by the Federal government, Justice Brewer set out language on the con75 Id. at 312.
76

Id.

77 Id. at 313.

Id.
Id. at 314.
80 Id. at 324.
81 See id. at 324-26.
82 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
83 Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 325 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635).
78
79
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struction of the fifth amendment which has been widely, though
only partially quoted, and just as widely misconstrued. (The
usual quotations stop before the italicized portions set out below,
and make the quote seem more broadly intended than was actually the case.). 8 4
So that if the adjective "just" had been omitted, and the provision was simply that property should not be taken without
compensation, the natural import of the language would be
that the compensation should be the equivalent of the property. And this is made emphatic by the adjective "just." There
can, in view of the combination of those two words, be no
doubt that the compensation must be a full and perfect
equivalent for the property taken. And this just compensation,
it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to the owner.
Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment is personal. 'No
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,' etc. Instead of continuing that form of statement,
and saying that no person shall be deprived of his property
without just compensation, the personal element is left out,
and the "just compensation" is to be a full equivalent for the
property taken. This excludes the taking into account, as an element in
the compensation, any supposed benefit that the owner may receive in
common with all from the public uses to which his private property is

appropriated,and leaves it, to stand as a declaration, that no private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full
85
and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner.
The historical and linguistic force of this argument is problematical at best,8 6 but it is not in any sense a declaration of either the
"value to the taker" theory, or of the proposition that what is to be
submitted to market value analysis is that which the taker took to
use, as opposed to that which the condemnee had which was de84 The first example of such truncated quotation appears to have been in
Cormack, supra note 11, at 237. Cormack's characterization was tentative, but for
an egregious example of what it grew into, see Dolan, Consequential Damages in Federal Condemnations, 35 VA. L. REV. 1059, 1059-60 (1949). Other examples are noted
in the entries in the appendix infra.
85 Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added).
86 The emphasis given to the change in wording seems to have been rejected in
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910) where Justice Holmes said that the just compensation clause deals "with persons, not with
tracts of land." Id. at 195. For historical criticism of Justice Brewer's position, see
Note, supra note 41, at 68. See generally Sax, Police Power, supra note 3; Stoebuck, A
General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972); Comment, The Ori-

gins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94
YALE L.J. 694 (1985).
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stroyed.8s Indeed, the remainder of the opinion is in large part devoted to making that crystal clear, which is best summed up in the
following language:
It is also suggested that the government does not take this
franchise; that it does not need any authority from the State
for the exaction of tolls, if it desires to exact them; that it only
appropriates the tangible property, and then either makes the
use of it free to all, or exacts such tolls as it sees fit, or transfers the property to a new corporation of its own creation, with
such a franchise to take tolls as it chooses to give. But this
franchise goes with the property; and the Navigation Company, which owned it, is deprived of it. The government takes it
away from the company, whatever use it may make of it; and
the question of just compensation is not determined by the
value to the government which takes, but the value to the individual from whom the property is taken; and when by the taking of the tangible property the owner is actually deprived of
the franchise to collect tolls, just compensation requires payment, not merely of the value of the tangible property itself,
but also of that of the franchise of which he is deprived.8 8
Nor is Monongahela a case where the government only had to
pay for the "franchise" to take tolls because it "took the business in
order to run it" as the opinion of the Court likewise makes clear.
Justice Brewer did avert to the irony that after the condemnation the
government would have had the right to charge tolls.8 9 The language just quoted, however, makes clear that the result is based on
the market value of what the government took from the company,
not whether or not the government itself intended to use the right
to collect tolls, and notwithstanding the fact that the government
had the right to collect tolls even before the condemnation at any
point on the river which it saw fit, and thus obtained no new right
itself by virtue of its destruction of the company's right.
Nor does the decision depend on anything peculiar to the river
lock business, as an extended discussion concerning the applicability of the opinion to an attempt to condemn the physical assets of a
railroad independent of its going business value makes clear.9 ° It is
87 Such a misconstruction has occasionally been put on Monongahela even in high
places. See dictum by Justice Doulgas in United States ex rel TVA v. Powelson, 319
U.S. 266, 282 (1943).
88 Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 343 (italics supplied). For a similar emphasis on
what was destroyed, see id. at 341.
89 Id. at 337.
90 Id. at 342-43. Attempts to view Monongahela as limited in its applicable principles to condemnations of governmentally granted special franchises are unpersua-
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true that in light of the Federal government's absolute power over
navigable waters, a line of later cases construes the requirement of
any compensation in Monongahela to be based upon an estoppel theory because the Federal government itself invited the construction
of the dam and lock. 9 ' However, none of these cases affects the vitality of Monongahela'sconstruction of what constitutes just compensation under the Constitution, assuming the obligation to pay
92

something.

It was twenty-three years before another case raising a business
damage issue under the just compensation clause made it to the
Supreme Court. That case, Bothwell v. United States,9 3 grew out of the

construction of the Pathfinder Dam in Wyoming. A man named
Bothwell and some partners owned a large tract of land in Wyoming, and in June of 1909 they had one thousand head of cattle on
the land, plus a large quantity of hay, apparently intended as feed. 94
The dam arrested the flood waters and caused inundation of the
Bothwell land.9 5 The hay was destroyed, and it was necessary to remove the cattle and sell them.9 6 The land was paid for. 97 The hay
sive given the language of the opinion, but have been common. See, e.g., Cormack,

supra note 11, at 242 (citing 1J. LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN § 407 (3d ed. 1909); 1 P.
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 68, at 361 (2d ed. 1917)).
91 See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913);
Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915).
Implied reservations of power to take without compensation no longer play
any role in our constitutional "takings" doctrines, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 104 S.
Ct. 2862 (1984), though express reservations may still be made which defeat any
argument of compensability on destruction or taking. United States v. Fuller, 409

U.S. 490 (1972).
For some history on the reservation argument and the use of express reservations for road purposes in colonial land grants, see Stoebuck, supra note 86, at 55759.
92 In fact, it seems that the Court in Monongahela not only held that the Constitution required an award of direct damages, but may also have assumed that the Constitution might require compensation of some "consequential" damages as well.
This is underscored by the Court's opinion four years later in Backus v. Fort St.
Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557 (1897), whereJustice Brewer, discussing just compensation due a business which might relocate, said:
The profitableness of the business was undoubtedly a matter to be considered, and so the judge fairly intimated in these prior colloquies. But
the profits of a business are not destroyed unless the business is not only
there stopped, but also one which in its nature cannot be carried on
elsewhere. If it can be transferred to a new place and there prosecuted
successfully, then the total profits are not appropriated, and the injury is
that which flows from the change of location.
Backus, 169 U.S. at 574-75.
93 254 U.S. 231 (1920).
94 Id. at 232.
95
96
97

Id.
Id.
Id.
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was paid for.9 8 Bothwell claimed that the cattle were sold "at prices
below their fair value" 9 and sought to recover the asserted
difference. 0 0
Justice McReynolds delivered a page and a half opinion for the
Court denying Bothwell's claim. It is true that in so doing he wrote
that nothing could be "recovered for the destruction of a business
or loss sustained through enforced sale of the cattle. There was no
actual taking of these things by the United States, and consequently
no basis for an implied promise to make compensation."' 0' 1 The
very sparse record of the facts of the case, however, makes it difficult
to know exactly what was meant by the quoted language, and the
actual claim to which it was applied.'0 2
Most importantly, whatever the facts, note what Bothwell was
clearly not offering to prove. He was not offering to prove the market value of the ranch as an operating entity less the sale price, or
salvage value, of the cattle. Had he done so his case would have
been a case of direct damages controlled by Monongahela, and nothing in the Court's short opinion can be read as requiring a different
98

Id.

99 Id.

Id.
101 Id. at 233.
100

102 Consider the facts of the case, so far as they are known. I say so far as they are
known because the case was decided in the Court of Claims without opinion, and
the only clue we have to certain important facts is that the claim seems to have been
that the cattle were sold for less than theirfair value, not for less than their market
value.
The Union Pacific Railroad linked Montana with Chicago in 1867. Given the
presence of rail service in Montana in 1909, it seems very unlikely that Bothwell's
sale was below prevailing cattle market prices and was merely the result of his
neighbors taking advantage of his hardship. Rather, it appears more likely that
Bothwell was complaining that prices would have been better later, especially in
regard to yearlings and calves that he could have held until fattened and sold in a
more attractive condition onto a market he thought he could predict would be seasonally better.
However, that claim is clearly a problematical and consequential claim. For
one thing, his forced sale not only denied Bothwell the potential benefits of the
expected rise in the market, it also removed the potential risk that the market would
go down. Further, it removed the risk that the cattle would all get hoof and mouth
disease and die. It further removed from Bothwell the need to expend resources
tending and feeding the cattle. And to have allowed Bothwell his claim would have
given him a double recovery insofar as he was already being compensated for the
hay he would have had to feed the cattle to take advantage of the expected better
market. In short, Bothwell seems to have been another of those over-reaching
claimants whose attempts at double recovery have so long been a factor in keeping
this area of the law confused.
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0 3
result, or creating a different principle.1
The next case in which the issue of business damages was peripherally raised was Joslin Manufacturing v. Providence."0 4 This is the
first case in which the Court repeats the by-then hornbook state
court rule, "[i]njury to a business carried on upon lands taken for
public use, it is generally held, does not constitute an element of
just compensation."' 0 5 The Court cites only Lewis's treatise on eminent domain 1 0 6 and Cox v. Philadelphia Railroad,' 7 a Pennsylvania
case factually similar to, and based directly on, Thoburn. This rather
off-hand statement is clearly dictum, however. The case before the
Court dealt with an attack on the constitutionality of a Rhode Island
statute providing for the payment of such damages, and the
Supreme Court's opinion merely holds that such a statute is constitutional even assuming that such payment is not required as a constitutional minimum.
08
In 1925 the Supreme Court decided Mitchell v. United States,1
the condemning authorities' all time favorite Supreme Court case in
this area. Once again the case means a great deal less than is usually
claimed.
The Mitchell Brothers owned 440 acres of farmland near Aberdeen, Maryland, upon which they had a factory devoted to the canning of a premium variety of corn known as Shoe Peg corn.'1 9 They
themselves grew 200 acres of Shoe Peg corn, and the rest of the
capacity of the canning plant was filled by another 300 acres' worth
grown by farmers in the surrounding area." 0 In 1917 Congress
passed a statute providing for the taking of all the lands in the vicinity for use by the ordinance branch of the military as the Aberdeen

103 Even if some tenable scenario could be constructed whereby Bothwell actually
was forced to sell his cattle below their then current market value, Bothwell's claim
would not have been a true claim for direct damages insofar as it sought to split up
the tradable entity (the operating cattle ranch) into subparts, each valued independently. Such splitting, especially where parts are to be valued by different theories
of value, always raises problems of double recovery and is generally not allowed.
Even if one were to construe Bothwell as a direct damages case, it would mean little
in light of the relevant more recent Supreme Court decisions discussed infra section
VII(B).
104 262 U.S. 668 (1922).
105
106

Id. at 675.
2J. LEWIS,

EMINENT DOMAIN

§ 727 (3d ed. 1909).

215 Pa. 506, 64 A. 729 (1906).
108 267 U.S. 341 (1925).
109 Id. at 343.
110 Mitchell v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 443, 444 (1923), affd, 267 U.S. 341
(.1925).
107
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Proving Ground.' 1 To compensate those whose land was to be
used, negotiations were entered into. 122 The statute provided that if
the government's offers were unacceptable to the condemnee, seventy-five percent of the final offer could be drawn down, and an action brought for such just compensation as was due under the
law.1 3 The government offered the Mitchells $76,000 for their land
and canning factory, a sum which, according to a finding of the
Court of Claims, "did not make any allowance for damage for plaintiffs loss of the business in which they were engaged prior to and at
the time of the taking of said property";' " but the exact meaning of
that finding is somewhat problematical as we shall see. The Mitchells accepted that sum, without protest. 115 Some time later, the
Mitchells figured out that they could not take their $76,000 and return to the Shoe Peg corn canning business, at least in Maryland,
because all of the land in Maryland suitable for growing Shoe Peg
corn had likewise been taken by the government. They then filed
suit in the Court of Claims seeking to recover $100,000 as "losses
sustained from being foreclosed from conducting [their] business
enterprise, coupled with the complete extinction of [their] source of
supply,""' resulting in their being "unable to reestablish their canning industry anywhere in the United States"' 17 even though their
"whole training and experience" had been in the growing and canning of "whole grain Shoe Peg corn."" ' 8
On these facts the Court of Claims made two rulings: first, that
under the terms of the statute, they were foreclosed from raising
this new claim as a result of their acceptance of the offer of the government of $76,000;"' and second, that even if they could raise the
claim they had received just compensation because they had failed
to prove that they had "upon the whole, sustained any reduction or
loss in net income or any other loss by reason of the government's
taking their said property and the discontinuance of their said busiI'

Mitchell,
Mitchell
(1925).
'13 Mitchell,
'14 Mitchell
(1925).
115 Mitchell,
116 Mitchell
112

267 U.S. at 342-43.
v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 443, 444 (1923), aff'd, 267 U.S. 341
267 U.S. at 343-44.
v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 443, 445 (1923), affrd, 267 U.S. 341

267 U.S. at 343.
v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 443, 448 (1923), afd, 267 U.S. 341

(1925).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 445.
119 Id. at 448.
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ness of the growing of corn."' 2 ° The Court of Claims pointed out
that plaintiffs' average annual income for the preceding five years
from the entire enterprise package of farming, canning, and selling
corn had been $6000.2' Without invasion of capital, their $76,000
yielded them an almost risk-free $4560 per year, leaving them free
to employ their time to make up the remaining $1440 per year.' 22 It
is clear that the Court of Claims was skeptical that their previous
experience as growers and canners of Shoe Peg corn had not left
them with salable skills.' 2 ' It is also clear that the exact issue of the
fair market value of the farm and canning business as a package was
not directly raised by the Mitchells, or ruled upon by either the
Court of Claims or the Supreme Court. It seems fair to say, though,
that the Court of Claims was suspicious that the $76,000 was as
much as they could ever have hoped to get from the sale of the package as a going business, when one considers that any buyer would
have had to make up for their labor to keep the $6000 per year
profit coming in. What the Mitchells' asserted $100,000 claim
seems to have been based upon mostly was a variety of "value to the
owner" theory, version 1.124 Success under that theory would have
awarded them a kind of Wiergelt premium for forcing them to change
occupations even though their financial position had not in fact
been diminished by the results of the taking of their property, and
they appear to have been paid "direct damage" enterprise value.
And, to the extent their claims were based on anything economic,
they almost certainly were seeking double recovery. In sum, the
Mitchells were two more very greedy claimants.
The Supreme Court disposed of their claim in a four page opinion by Justice Brandeis. In reading the opinion, two things must be
kept firmly in mind. First, the plaintiffs never claimed that they did
not receive market value for their canning operation as of the date
of payment. Second, the "destruction of their business" they were
asserting was not the result of the taking of their canning factory
property per se, but was asserted to have been the result of the condemnation of the surrounding land belonging to others. That destruction would have substantially occurred if they had been left
alone and all the other corn land taken. 125 Complaints about the
effects of the taking of their property were foreclosed by their settle120
121
122
123

Id. at 446.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 449.
Id.

124 See supra section VI.
125

At least, the effect would have been substantially the same even if their own
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ment, 12 6 but the effects springing from the taking of other property
could still be raised. Thus understood, the issue was whether their
relationship to those other takings by the government was such as to
give them any right to claim anything at all under the fifth
amendment.
Consider the quote from Mitchell usually relied upon as relieving condemning authorities from a constitutional obligation to pay
for a destroyed business, usually quoted without reference to the
facts of the case, or worse, with a summary of the facts which makes
it sound as if the destruction of business theory put forth by the
Mitchells was one flowing directly from the taking of their own land
and property: 127
The special value of land due to its adaptability for use in a
particular business is an element which the owner of land is
entitled, under the Fifth Amendment, to have considered in
determining the amount to be paid as the just compensation
upon a taking by eminent domain. Doubtless such special
value of the plaintiffs' land was duly considered by the President in fixing the amount to be paid therefor. The settled
rules of law, however, precluded his considering in that determination consequential damages for losses to their business,
or for its destruction. No recovery therefor can be had now as
for a taking of the business. There is no finding as a fact that
the Government took the business, or that what it did was intended as a taking. If the business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended incident of the taking of land. 2 '
All Justice Brandeis says is that they are not entitled to consequential damages for the loss to their business, or for its destruction,
which was the "unintended incident of the taking of land" . . . not their

land, but the land around them. He then says "no recovery can be
had now as for the taking of the business." 1 29 The "now" in this
sentence is significant. All they were asserting now was consequential damages. They had never asserted direct damage market value
destruction of their business as a result of the taking of their own
corn land had not been taken, since they depended on the other land for 60% of
their supply.
126 Mitchell v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 443, 448 (1923), af'd, 267 U.S. 341
(1925).
127 See Comment,Just Compensationfor the Small Business Man, 2 COLUM.J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 144, 147-48 (1968). For a misconstruction of Mitchell with an inaccurate
summary of the facts, see Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 2, at 615-16.
128 Mitchell, 267 U.S. at 345 (citations omitted).
129 Id. (italics supplied).
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land, and even if they had tried, the Court of Claims had already all
but held that they had already received it.
As such, Mitchell is in fact not very relevant to the subject of this
article, a direct damages claim for destruction of a business by the
condemnation of the business premises. It is more closely related to
the problems raised by cases where one's sole supplier is condemned-cases raising hard questions of line drawing on the "taking-no taking" frontl'3 0-but bearing hardly at all on the measure of
just compensation when something requiring compensation is concededly in issue.
The business damages question did not arise again in the
Supreme Court until the 1940's, in United States v. General Motors
Corp. 13' That case was the first of three that form a sort of package:
General Motors, United States v. Petty Motor Co. , 32 and United States v.
Westinghouse Co. 133 All three of these cases deal with a nefarious condemnation device which concededly created special problems, and
some dismiss the implications of these cases on that ground. 134 The
device was the condemnation of a leasehold interest rather than a
fee interest to enable the government to obtain space in a building
cheaply. When the taking of such a leasehold evicted the possessor
(either the fee owner or the holder of a leasehold interest longer
than that taken by the government), especially unfair problems were
created in that the possessor had to move out, but could not permanently relocate because he had to hold himself ready to move back
when the government was through.
In General Motors a condemnation of a one-year term and option
to renew was sought from a lessee of a warehouse who had a twentyyear term. 1 35 In this case, Justice Roberts, while rejecting removal
cost as an independent item of value, rephrased the market value
rule so as to allow its consideration. He said that the normal market
value rule would pay the rental value of a vacant building to be
leased for a long term.' 36 Here he would construct a hypothetical
market-the value which a hypothetical long-term tenant in possession would exact when leasing to a temporary occupier requiring his
130

See, e.g., Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 501 (1922); see also

supra note 3.
131

323 U.S. 373 (1945).

132

327 U.S. 372 (1945).

133 339 U.S. 261 (1949).
134 See Dolan, supra note 84.
135 General Motors, 323 U.S. at 375.
136 Id. at 381.
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37

removal. 1
The result of General Motors with its artificial resort to non-existent hypothetical markets and its flirtation with value-to-the-owner
theory, is perhaps subject to any number of criticisms,13 8 but it is

hardly a case supporting the existence of a constitutional doctrine
that business damages need never be compensated pursuant to the
just compensation clause. Indeed, it undermines such a claim even
as to consequential damages, as all the removal costs and other elements raised in that case certainly were. Nor does the fact that Petty
Motors and Westinghouse later restricted the conceptually flawed General Motors approach exclusively to cases of partial takings bear on
the case at hand, because the only issues in Petty Motors and Westinghouse were not assertions of immediate market value destruction,
that is, "direct damages." The case that did contain an assertion of
direct damages was Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 1 39 and once
140
again, the condemnee prevailed.
In Kimball Laundry the United States took over a laundry's facilities to do washing for the army. 14 ' The laundry, having no other
means of serving its customers, suspended business for the duration
of the army's occupation.14 2 The company was given rental value of
the facilities for the period the army used the premises, but no
award for the loss of customers and resultant diminution in going
business value, which was claimed by the company and recognized
as probable by the appraisers.143 The Court, through Justice Frankfurter, made the government pay the diminution in the going concern value of the business. In reaching this conclusion, Justice
Frankfurter first observed that the loss in going concern value,
though related in part to intangibles, is property capable of being
destroyed by the government so as to give rise to an obligation of
137 Id. at 382-84.

138 For a criticism of the practical unintelligibility of the General Motors approach
to appraisers and lawyers, see Dolan, supra note 84.
139 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
140 It is true that there is language in GeneralMotors assuming the existence of the
mythical "no business damages" rule in general and, as a starting point of analysis,
an unjustifiably broad meaning for Mitchell and Bothwell apparently accepted from
secondary sources. See General Motors, 323 U.S. at 379. Similar statements may be
found in Petty Motors, Westinghouse, and indeed in Kimball Laundry-even in United
States ex rel TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943), which doesn't even deal with a
business damages issue. These dicta do not change the actual facts of either the
cases cited, or of the cases citing them.
141 Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 3.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 4.
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just compensation under the fifth amendment. 144 Then, he posed
the question: "When do such circumstances occur?"' 4 5 Justice
Frankfurter conceded, arguendo, that such circumstances do not arise
in the normal taking of a fee interest, making the by then predictable
mis-citations to Mitchell and Bothwell. 1 46 This, he said, could only be
justifiable because the intangible parts of the value of the business
are normally transferable. Note that he did not say that there can
never be a fee condemnation situation giving rise to an obligation to
give full going business value as just compensation. In fact, he illustrated that obligation by cases involving the taking of the land and
buildings of a public utility. 147 He then went on:

But the public utility cases plainly cannot be explained by the
fact that the taker received the benefit of the utility's going
concern value. If benefit to the taker were made the measure
of compensation, it would be difficult to justify higher compensation for farm land taken as a firing range than for swamp
or sandy waste equally suited to the purpose. It would be
equally difficult to deny compensation for value to the taker in
excess of value to owner. The rationale of the public utility
cases, as opposed to those in which circumstances have
brought about a diminution of going concern value although
the owner remained free to transfer it, must therefore be that
an exercise of the power of eminent domain which has the inevitable effect of depriving the owner of the going concern
value of his
148

business is a compensable "taking" of property.
Note that the "inevitable effect" test is in no way limited to condemnations of terms for years.' 49 Note also that in bringing the
laundry itself within the terms of the "inevitable effect" test, Justice
Frankfurter relied on the economic practicalities of the laundry business and the inability of the laundry to create another plant economically when it was going to eventually have to take the first plant
back. It was not the normal situation where a condemnee receives
enough from the taking of the first plant to obtain a second.
It seems clear that on the facts of our typical case set out earlier
in this article, Smith's loss of his gas station business meets Justice
Frankfurter's "inevitable effect" test. First, as is generally the case,
144 Id. at
145 Id.
146 Id. at
147 Id. at
148 Id. at

11.

11-12.
12-13.
13 (italics supplied).
149 Some commentators have misconstrued Kimball Laundry on this point. See
Note, Eminent Domain: Compensationfor Value of Trade Routes Destroyed by Condemnation
for Temporary Use, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 680, 683 n.26 (1949).
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his franchise was tied to a particular location. It is what we might
call an incorporeal fixture. Hence, it inevitably disappears as a result
of the taking of the land. Second, as a practical inevitability, the
value it represents cannot be "relocated"--to be replaced it must be
repurchased. Indeed, the "inevitable effects" test appears to be the
concept of "direct damages" reinvented.
B.

Relevant Post-1960 United States Supreme Court Cases

The next case of direct bearing on the issues under consideration is Armstrong v. United States.' 5 ' Armstrong dealt with the destruction of liens on a vessel by virtue of its transfer to the United
States. Though the Court never adverts to any such argument,
on its facts Armstrong might be considered a sort of "taking of
value for use by the government" case. The recent decision of
United States v. Security Industrial Bank," 5 'dealing with the lien
avoidance provision of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 15 2 however,
makes it clear that such abolition of liens by the government requires just compensation no matter who the economic beneficiary
of the destruction may be, even if not the government.
Viewed in that light, consider the following passage from the
Armstrong opinion:
The total destruction by the Government of all value of these
liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of the Fifth Amendment "taking" and is not a
mere "consequential incidence" of a valid regulatory measure.
Before the liens were destroyed, the lienholders admittedly
had compensable property. Immediately afterward, they had
none. This was not because their property vanished into thin
air. It was because the Government for its own advantage destroyed the value of the liens, something. . . which no private
purchaser could have done. Since this acquisition was for a
public use, however accomplished, whether with an intent and
purpose of extinguishing the liens or not, the Government's
action did destroy them and in the circumstances of this case
did thereby take the53 property value of those liens within the
Fifth Amendment.1
Assuming for the moment that Smith's lease-franchise package
364 U.S. 40 (1960).
151 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
152 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 93-353, 98 Stat. 333.
153 Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48.
150
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is compensable property, the relevance of the quoted passage to
Smith's situation is made crystal clear simply by substituting the
word "franchise" for the word "lien" in the passage.
If there was ever any doubt that a gasoline retailer's business
operated pursuant to a lease-franchise arrangement with an oil company constitutes a single unitary "compensable property" package
subject to fifth amendment protection and compensation requirements, that doubt has been dispelled by decisions of the United
States Supreme Court over the last fifteen years. In a series of cases
beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly, 1 54 and continuing through Board of
Regents v. Roth,' 5 5 Perry v. Sinderman,'5 6 Paul v. Davis,' 5 ' and Bishop v.
Wood,' 58 the Court has clarified the proper constitutional approach
to distinguishing non-protected, non-property, mere "expectations" from "entitlements," which constitute property for fifth
amendment purposes. The test is whether applicable non-constitutional substantive law creates a "legal guarantee of present enjoyment"' 159 in a way that is special to the person asserting it,
understood in terms of rules that support a "claim to
60
entitlement."
Smith's right pursuant to the lease-franchise arrangement, as
set out in that contractual document, and as further defined by Federal and state law, are thus significant. First of all, the franchise
agreement is a contract, protected by state law. Furthermore, pursuant to section 102(a) of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act' 6 1
(PMPA) no franchisor may terminate or fail to renew a franchise for
the distribution of motor fuel except for the reasons specified in section 102(b).' 6 2 Pursuant to that subsection, the only four circumstances for which a franchisor may terminate the lease-franchise
without the franchisee's approval are situations which would commonly be described as "for cause." Thus, prior to condemnation,
the gasoline retailer had a legally enforceable right to maintain his
valuable franchise business-in other words, he was legally "entitled" to do so.
Thus, the franchisee's right to its lease-franchise business con154
155

397 U.S. 254 (1970).

408 U.S. 564 (1972).

156

408 U.S. 593 (1972).

157

424 U.S. 693 (1976).

158

159

426 U.S. 341 (1976).
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

160

Perry, 408 U.S. at 601; see Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449

U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
161 15 U.S.C. § 2802(a) (1982).
162 Id. § 2802(b).
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stitutes property under the Supreme Court's test. This would be
true if it were only the product of a private contractual arrangement.
As the Supreme Court has recently made clear in Security Industrial
Bank, valid contract-created rights are property for fifth amendment
purposes. 163 The effect of the PMPA and any similar or supplementary state protections of franchisors substantially reinforces the
compensable property status of the gasoline retailers' leasefranchise operation. For instance, in Smith's case, since his business
is in New Jersey, the effect of the relevant provisions of the PMPA
and the NewJersey Franchise Practices Act' 6 4 is that his franchise is
terminable only after notice and a showing of good cause as defined
by the PMPA, and is generally transferable as long as the New Jersey
statutory procedures and conditions are met. 6 5 This combination
of restricted terminability and general transferability created by specific legislation clearly gives the franchise the characteristics of property in both the traditional juridical sense and under the applicable
Supreme Court test.
Nor can one persuasively argue that the idea of property reflected in this test is only for the due process clause and not for the
just compensation clause. 1 66 First, the two uses of the word "property" are separated by only seven words in the fifth amendment.
Second, the Supreme Court has just recently held in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto16 7 that the same test must be applied in the just compensation area. The result of this case was that the Federal government
had to pay the diminution in value of trade secrets protected by
state law but disclosed to the government under statutory confidentiality guarantees contained in the 1972 to 1978 version of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act' 6 8 (FIFRA), and
then disclosed to competitors by the government. In so holding,
the Court said that: "intangible property rights protected by state
1169
law are deserving of the protection of the Taking Clause ....
163 The proposition that contract rights are property for just compensation purposes is not new. See Brook-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924).
164 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).
165 Id. § 56:10-6.
166 "The body of rules determining which expectations constitute compensable

property interests and which do not plainly require reconsideration in light of the
broader definition of property interests now employed in the law of procedural due
process. There seems no good reason why the broader definition should not be
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 459
n. 11 (1978) (citations omitted).

extended to the takings context." L.
167

104 S.Ct. 2862 (1984).

168 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 - 136 y (1976 & Supp.II 1978) (current version as amended at
7 U.S.C. §§ 136 - 13 6 y (1982)).
169 Ruckelshaus, 104 S.Ct. at 2873-74.
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This is especially true of "reasonable investment-backed expectations, "170 which the lease-franchise business of a gasoline retailer
certainly is.
The Court then held that the FIFRA confidentiality guarantees
foreclosed the argument that Monsanto had chosen voluntarily to
subject its trade secrets to disclosure in order to obtain the benefits
of licensing.17 ' Finally the Court held that, while a sovereign at the
original creation of a new system of legally backed expectations
might in some narrowly and clearly defined cases expressly reserve
72
the right to take or destroy such interests without compensation, 1
once an interest is protected in such a way to be compensable property, it may not then be destroyed without compensation by declaring it not to be property, or not to be property as against the
sovereign.
[A] sovereign, "by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation .

.

.

. This is

the very kind of thing that the Taking
Clause of the Fifth
73
Amendment was meant to prevent."'1
Finally, it was held to be irrelevant to the compensation requirement that the advantages of the trade secret had not been
taken over by the United States government, that in great part the
economic value they represented had merely disappeared, or that
any beneficiaries of disclosure were private enterprises.1 74 The destructions were takings; the decision to make the destructions was
for "a public use" in the general sense in which that term is interpreted. The clear implication is that the government cannot support its action on the broad definition and then only make
provisions for just compensation based on a narrower definition. So
much for the "taking for use" doctrine occasionally invoked to jus75
tify the "no business damages" rule.'
Nor can a condemning authority say that it need not pay the
price represented by market value of the lease-franchise business as
170 Id. at 2875. Earlier I adverted to a dichotomy between "mere expectations"
and "entitlements." See supra text accompanying note 158. The cases giving rise to

that dichotomy often spoke only of "expectations" as the term for non-property,

but apparently, some "expectations," that is "reasonable investment-backed expectations," are property for fifth amendment purposes. See id.
171 Ruckelshaus, 104 S. Ct. at 2877-79.
172 See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 490 (1972). See generally Comment, United
States v. Fuller:Just Compensation?, 4 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 229 (1973).
173 Ruckelshaus, 104 S. Ct. at 2878 (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
174 Id. at 2879-80.
175 See supra note 56.
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it is usually sold because such a price contains some undivided increment for some sort of "goodwill." First, these recent Supreme
Court cases render the assertion that "goodwill" is not compensable
property under the fifth amendment totally untenable in most
states. In light of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, such goodwill is property
under most states' laws, even viewed as an independent and rather
artificial entity. 17 6 Second, the lease-franchise business package itself had already been held to be vested with the characteristics of
property relevant to the constitutional test by decisions in some
177

states.

Finally, even if goodwill were not independently protected
property, and even if a state had not already ruled on the issue of
the scope of the "property package" in a lease-franchise context, the
condemning authority would still have to pay market value of the
under Almota Farmers
business less salvage value (direct damages)
178
Elevator and Warehouse Co. v. United States.
The facts of Almota Farmers are as follows. There was a piece of
land in Washington State owned by a railroad. 179 It was in a farmland area, and it was next to a railroad track.' Prior to 1919 there
were many parcels of land which were arguably of the same economic potential as sites for grain elevators, but we may assume the
area would support only one. Along came the Almota Farmers Elevator and Warehouse Company. Instead of purchasing land, for
whatever reason, it leased the land from the railroad and built a
grain elevator. 18 1 The elevator company retained the ownership 18of2
the grain elevator and other improvements by specific agreement.
The railroad and the elevator company entered into an unbroken
series of leases, each for a term of years. 18 3 The grain elevator company had no legal right to a lease renewal.' 8 4 However, in the event
of non-renewal, the company could knock down the improvements,
leaving the railroad with only undeveloped land with low income
176 Even Nichols recognizes the factual predicate of this assertion. "Goodwill is
generally held property in matters of private law." 2 P. Nichols &J. Sackman, supra
note 15, § 5.24, at 5-293 n.4 and authorities there collected.
177 In New Jersey, for instance, there can be no doubt of the protected property
status of a franchise business in general and a petroleum marketing franchise in
particular after the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Westfield Centre Serv.
v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 86 N.J. 453, 432 A.2d 48 (1981).
178 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
179 Id. at 471.
180 Id. at 470-71.

181

Id.

182

Id. at 471.

183 Id. at 475.
184 Id. at 473.
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potential.' 8 5 If the surrounding environment changed to where the
parcel of land without a grain elevator would be worth more than
the rental from the one elevator in the area, only then would the
lease rationally not be renewed. Hence, unless the surrounding
land changed uses by the natural operation of market forces, which
Almota Farmers could watch and if necessary
guard against, the
86
lease would always be rationally renewed.'
Apparently no such change in surrounding land uses occurred
from 1919 to 1967, as the lease was always renewed. Further, at the
point just before the government-as-taker showed up, the lease plus
the buildings had a substantial market value far in excess of the formal seven and one-half years left on the lease, because a rational
purchaser could see the forces making the lease de facto indefinite,
and would pay for the added value.' 8 7
In 1967, the United States government decided to take the land
for some public project that could only be accomplished by use of
eminent domain. 88 It condemned the interest of Almota Farmers
and argued that it should only have to pay the market value of the
narrow legal right destroyed-the seven and one-half years left on
the lease.' 8 9 Not so, said the Court. Just compensation demanded
that Almota Farmers get the fair market value of what they had
before the government surfaced as a market factor, and without any
effect of the government action.' 9 0 Since the market would rationally have paid a certain sum for their lease and buildings, that was
what was takenfrom them even though part of that price for the asset
resulted from market evaluations of conditions not themselves the
property of Almota Farmers. Markets always reflect such estimates.
Nor could the government have avoided this result by purchasing
the land first, since the government still had to pay just compensation "for those interests 'probably within the scope of the project
from the time the Government was committed to it.' ,,191
It may not take advantage of any depreciation in the property
taken that is attributable to the project itself. At the time of
the taking in this case, there was an expectancy that the improvements would be used beyond the lease term. But the
185

Id. at 471.

Id. at 474-75.
Id. at 478.
United States v. 22.95 Acres of Land, More or Less, 450 F.2d 125, 126 (9th
Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United
186
187
188

States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
189 Almota Farmers, 409 U.S. at 471.
190 Id. at 478; id. at 480 (Powell, J., concurring).
191 Id. at 477-78 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943)).
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Government has sought to pay compensation on the theory
that at that time there was no possibility that the lease would
be renewed and the improvements used beyond the lease
term. It has asked that the improvements be valued as though
there were no possibility of continued use. That is not how
the market would have valued such improvements; it is not
what a private buyer would have paid Almota.
The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of
fairness as it does from technical concepts of property law. It
is, of course, true that Almota should be in no better position
than if it had sold its leasehold to9 a2 private buyer. But its position should surely be no worse.'
Almota Farmers, one must note, is the Supreme Court's third direct-damage-theory business destruction case. And whether the expression was in terms of "the market value of what was taken from
the condemnee" as in Monongahela, "inevitable effects" as in Kimball
Laundry, or those terms just quoted from Almota Farmers, the result
has always been the same. The Constitution requires such compensation to be paid.
In sum, Mr. Smith's lease-franchise in the fact situation described earlier is compensable property. It had a market value
which was completely destroyed by the taking of the land, and hence
taken from Mr. Smith thereby. In such a case, the fifth amendment
mandates payment, at a minimum, of the market value destoyed
(that is, direct damages) as just compensation for the property interest taken from Mr. Smith.

VIII.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

To

DIRECT DAMAGES

BEYOND THE FRANCHISE CONTEXT

The Smith situation throws the injustices of the mythical "no
business damages" rule and the treatment of businesses operating on condemned premises into sharp relief for three reasons.
First, his service station business is one where it is fairly easy to
192 Id. at 478 (quoting United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S.
121, 124 (1950)). Almota Farmers is surprisingly similar in fact, reasoning, and result

to Mayor of Baltimore v. Rise, 73 Md. 302, 21 A. 181 (1891), where the court said
flatly "A thing is worth what it can be sold for." Id. at 311, 21 A. at 182. This is one
of the cases which were ignored in the creation of the assumed "no business damages" rule. Note further that the one sentence arguendo misconstruction of Mitchell

in footnote 2 of the Almota Farmers opinion in no way detracts from either the facts
or reasoning of the decision-indeed, it renders Almota Farmers even more clearly
an adoption of the direct damages approach, as the rest of footnote 2 makes clear.
See Almota Farmers, 409 U.S. at 475-76 & n.2.
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show by normal valuation techniques what the market value of
the business as an organic and going package was, but for the
condemnation. Second, his franchise form of business and the
structure of gasoline retailing patterns in general make it easy to
show that the business is non-relocatable and completely destroyed by the condemnation, since if it is to be continued it must
be replaced by repurchase of a similar entity of like value. Third,
his status as a lessee means that the injustice of the situation cannot be hidden by submerging the loss in talk of the value of the
real property. 193 Nor can it be partially ameliorated in practice by
jury nullification through the award of a price for the fee interest,
which is in fact excessive under the theory of the law but which is
given in unrecognized compensation for losses the law claims not
to pay for.'" 4 Yet Smith's situation is not in theory different from
that ofJones operating a shoe repair shop from property that he
owns. There is often a significant difference between the market
value of the "land and improvements" and the market value of
the enterprise, including the "land and improvements." It may
also be true that new premises are practically unavailable, or at
least affordable ones close enough to speak sensibly of a business
being relocated instead of a new one being started.
To go one step further, Smith's situation is not constitutionally different from that of Whitney running his corner grocery
out of leased premises. It is really unsatisfactory to say that
Smith's business is compensable property and that of Jones and
Whitney is not. Legal protections specifically directed at
franchises merely buttress and make clear the property status of
Smith's business, they do not create it. In every state a business
may, for instance, be sold as an entity, and is protected by unfair
competition doctrines; thus, in every state, state law protections
which create constitutional property are present in regard to
every going enterprise as a whole. It seems unavoidable that
under the applicable Supreme Court decisions, Smith, Jones and
Whitney all have a right to be compensated for direct damages
resulting from the condemnation of their business premises.
The direct damages approach has further significant side
benefits. It radically clarifies certain analytical problems. It simplifies the elements of proof in condemnation valuation proceedings, and it is suggestive of the appropriate way of handling
193 See the rhetoric employed to this end in City of Trenton v. Lenzner, 16 N.J.
465, 109 A.2d 409 (1954).
194 See Note, supra note 41, at 87 n.120.
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disputes about "relocatability" or "non-relocatability" in regard
to a business operating out of condemned premises.
IX.

THE ADVANTAGES OF DIRECT DAMAGE THEORY IN
CLARIFYING ANALYSIS

The assumed "no business damages" rule is one of the most
universally and uniformly condemned doctrines of American
law." 5 Yet the critics' attacks, stretching over a period of seventyfive years, have had less impact than they ought to have had.
There are two main reasons for this. First, the critics seem to
have assumed a kind of juridical reality and authority for the assumed "rule" which a careful examination of the relevant
Supreme Court authorities does not bear out, as we have already
seen. Second, every suggestion for a change in the assumed
"rule" has involved a procedure in which losses of "good will"
and "lost opportunity" would be separately valued,' 96 raising
fears that valuation of such entities could not be fairly controlled,
since the valuation of such artificial entities lacks direct reference
to an extant market. Indeed, descriptions of the valuation procedures in those jurisdictions that have adopted these approaches
do have a kind of never-never-land flavor at a number of
points.'9 7 The direct damages approach avoids the problem of
valuing artificial entities and radically simplifies the proof
necesssary to arrive at truly just compensation. Its simplicity and
its reliance on market-disciplined valuation of normally traded
entities are two of its great strengths.
X.

DIRECT DAMAGES AND RELOCATABILITY

What about a situation in which the condemning authority is
disputing the total destruction of the business? What does direct
damages theory say about that situation?
One of the long-standing explanations for the no business
195 See infra, appendix.
196 Good examples of the unnecessary complexity that such an approach can engender are to be found in State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976); McCormick, supra note 41, at 476-82; Todd, supra note 51; UNIF. EMINENT DOMAIN CODE

§ 1016, 13 U.L.A. 1 (1980); Comment, Non-Compensable Business Losses in Eminent Domain Proceedings:A Timefor Re-evaluation, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 72 (1972); Comment, An Act
to Provide Compensationfor Loss of Goodwill Resultingfrom Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 445 (1965). The article which comes closest to developing a
direct damages notion is Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 61.
197 See, for example, the convoluted process mandated by the well meaning
opinion in State v. Hammer, 550 P.2d 820 (Alaska 1976).
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damages rule is the assumption that a business carried on condemned premises can usually relocate in such a way that nothing
is lost but the value of the premises themselves.' 98 How such a
situation, even if usually true, justifies a totally irrebuttable presumption that it is always true is quite problematical on both justice grounds and constitutional grounds.' 99 In a nineteenth
century village setting, perhaps the explanation had a sufficient
generality to at least explain the genesis of the assumed rule, if
not to justify it. 200 However, the completely arbitrary and inaccurate nature of the assumption in the context of twentieth century
condemnations, most often undertaken in urban areas, has been
repeatedly pointed

OUt. 2 0

1

Still, it iS possible that relocation can

occasionally give the condemnee a going business entity with a
value at least equal to that which was lost, at a cost less than the
full value of the business.
The solution to this problem and how it should be handled
procedurally lies in the normal damage theory concept of avoidable consequences.20 2 Instead of a rule based on a fictionally assumed ability to relocate, the law ought to proceed from a
presumption of non-relocatability. The condemning authority
would be free to reduce an award of full value for the business,
however, by showing relocation options which could protect the
original value of the business with an investment of less than full
value in relocation expenses. Since the condemnee is under a
duty to mitigate 20 3 by taking such an available relocation option,
the just compensation award would be limited to the amount of
relocation expenses in such a situation.
Finally, as in all mitigation situations, the burden of producing evidence and the risk of non-persuasion as to the existence of
a relocation option and its cost ought to be on the party relying
on the existence of mitigating circumstances to reduce an
award-that is, the condemning authority. Not only does this
track the normal doctrine of damage theory in other areas, but it
See, e.g., Kimball Laundy, 338 U.S. at 11-12.
199 See generally Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited: With Some Afterthoughts on the ConstitutionalProblems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. REV.
189 (1982).
200 See supra note 44.
201 See Comment, supra note 195, at 447-51 (proposed statute).
198

202

See D.

DOBBS,

supra note 21, at 186-90.

I have used the usual term "mitigate" in the text over the published objections of Professor Dobbs to the use of the term in the context of the doctrine of
avoidable consequences. See id. at 188. 1 tried for an elegant synonym and failed.
203
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is generally the condemning authority who has the resources to
seek out and to point out such relocation options.
DIRECT DAMAGES AND THE LARGE MULTI-SITE ENTERPRISE

One of the reasons I believe direct damage theory was lost
sight of in condemnation law is that it is not an obviously available option to the most well heeled condemnees-those who
have premises condemned where a part of a giant integrated operation is carried on.2 °4 If the business carried on at the condemned sight is separately traded, such as might be the case with
one of a number of chain stores, some of which are already separately franchised, direct damages might offer an option. However, where the entity is not traded, or is basically unsellable as
an entity, as for example, a General Motors assembly plant, then
direct damage theory would advance the inquiry very little.
Whether you conceive the direct damage as the disappearance of
the value of the single plant or the reduction of the net worth of
the whole enterprise, you are still faced with a valuation problem
not referable to an actual market-a very difficult proof problem.
Thus, while constitutionally mandated as an available option, and
of great aid to those victims of business condemnation most
crushed, 215 alas, direct damages theory does not solve all
problems. However, it is quite enough for me that it can accomplish what it does.
XII.

CONCLUSION

It has become commonplace that the conclusion of a law review article functions as an abstract of the article for those who
do not have the time or inclination to read the whole piece. Very
well. This is a useful convention, and I will conform:
This article does not attempt to deal with the interesting but
involved question of what government actions amount to a "taking" of private property. Instead, I have focused narrowly on the
question of the compensation required as "just compensation"
204 This may explain the reason the theory was not explored in such cases as
General Motors and Westinghouse.
205 That is, small business people. The victims of condemnation most crushed in

general are holders of residential leases, who end up with no homes and no money
(though relieved of the obligation to pay rent for the home they no longer have).

Direct damage theory does almost nothing for them, but that is another story. See
generally Klein, Eminent Domain:JudicialResponse to the Human Disruption, 46 U. DET. J.
URB. L. 1 (1968); Note, The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation and an Approach to
Full Indemnity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 801 (1969).

524

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:483

once all have agreed a taking has occurred. As demonstrated by
the hypothetical case of an owner of a service station franchise,
many owners of demonstrable and substantial business properties routinely receive far less than just compensation when their
interests are taken from them by an exercise of the power of eminent domain. These deplorable occurrences result primarily
from the blind and uncritical application of the so-called "no
business damages" rule.
A close examination of the so-called rule reveals, however,
that it is not a rule but a myth. First, it is based upon gross misinterpretations of case law extending back into the nineteenth century, carefully fostered and championed by the leading treatise
writers who were clearly biased in favor of condemning authorities. Second, the "no business damages" rule is in clear conflict
with United States Supreme Court authority, especially recent
cases recognizing the constitutionally protected status under the
just compensation clause of rights in reasonable investmentbacked expectations created by state law.
In order to ensure just compensation, the proper measure of
damages in eminent domain proceedings should be, as a constitutional minimum, all direct damage as defined in the seminal
early nineteenth century eminent domain cases. A close analysis
of every business damages case that has reached the Supreme
Court reveals that the Court has never failed to reach a result
consistent with this understanding of direct damages. Moreover,
because it tracks the normal application of remedies law in other
substantive areas, the use of direct damage theory guarantees a
result that not only appears fair, but also approximates as accurately as possible the true loss suffered by the condemnee. The
fifth amendment requires nothing less.
So much for the abstract. The real conclusion of this article,
however, is a question. Does the clear mandate of the Supreme
Court to award direct damages as a constitutional minimum,
combined with the near universal recognition of the injustice of
the assumed "no business damages" rule stand a chance to alter
the law in practice applied in everyday condemnation proceedings by local courts, courts which by habit draw their rules of
decision from slogans derived from such sources as Nichols's
treatise on eminent domain?
This question puts me in mind of the famous observations of
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Lord Camden in Entick v. Carringon.2 °6 In order to sustain the
validity of general search warrants, the Crown relied on an unbroken practice of seventy years' standing in the use of such warrants. Lord Camden replied that everyone had always known
that such warrants were contrary to the common law, and that
their survival in practice could only be explained by the fact that
they were usually directed only against those without the means
or sophistication to resort to the courts, "or such warrants could
never have passed for lawful till this time.

' 20 7

Yet the Entick case

finally came and the resort to general warrants was halted. Even
in the face of settled practice of longstanding it is not wholly irrational to hope.
206
207

95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
Id. at 818.
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APPENDIX

This Appendix collects, to the best of the author's ability,
every printed discussion since 1900 of the assumed "no business
damages" rule, or the "no consequential damages" rule, as they
have been assumed to apply on the condemnation of business
premises context. They are arranged chronologically. Of these
sources, 6 are purely descriptive (these are marked by an asterisk), 2 contain single lines which might be approvals of the rule
(these are marked with 2 asterisks), only 1 contains anything that
could be called an attempt at evaluative defense of the rule (this
is marked with 3 asterisks), and 42 condemn the assumed rule on
justice grounds.
Surely these data have something to do with an appropriate
evaluation of the justice of the assumed rule, according to prevailing societal standards, and surely justice has something to do
with "just compensation."
PERIODICALS

Note, Eminent Domain: Damages: Business, 4 CALIF. L. REV.
248 (1916).
Takes the rule against business damages to be based upon a
decision that business and goodwill are not "property."
Highly critical of rule. "A fairer and more logical result will be
reached when property is held to include land, business, good
will or other intangible attribute, and when for the taking,
deprivation or destruction of any of these the owner will be
entitled to compensation." Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
2. Note, Constitutional Law: Eminent Domain: Compensation for
Injury to Business, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1925) (student author: Doering).
Critical of rule. It creates "a situation which clearly works injustice." Id. at 218.
**3. Note, Eminent Domain-ConsequentialDamages, 26 COLUM. L.
REV. 625 (1926).
Contains a two line description of the rule, the second line of
which might be read to agree that such damages are "probably
too speculative," or on the other hand may merely be describing the position asserted by courts.
4. Note, Eminent Domain-Constitutional Law, Requirement of
Compensationfor Good Will, 39 HARV. L. REV. 654 (1926).
Critical of rule in its "denial of injury to good will" aspect.
"[I]n a case where an important element of good will is the
1.
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particular location of the business and removal is compelled, it
seems that compensation should be required for the damage
to good will." Id. at 655.
5. Note, Eminent Domain-Compensation-Damagesfor Loss of
Good-Will, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (1927).
Highly critical. "Upon analysis, it seems that the reasons assigned [for the rule] are more specious than real." Id. at 783.
6. Note, Eminent Domain-Loss of Good Will Excluded as an Element of Damages in Condemnation Proceedings, 78 U. PA. L. REV.
112 (1929).
Highly critical.
In an attempt to explain the reasons for adhering to the
general rule, the cases generally proceed upon two theories which are in direct conflict. One theory develops the
view that only the land is taken, thereby allowing the
business to be continued elsewhere carrying with it the
good will previously enjoyed, whereas the second theory
recognizes the fact that something more than land has
been taken but because of the intangible nature of good
will no compensation can be allowed. The first theory
fails to recognize the fact that the removal of a business
often occasions a loss of good will. In the event that
there is such a loss caused by the taking of the land, the
owner must bear the loss as has been pointed out in the
general rule. That the second theory is questionable is
seen from the fact that the courts quite readily protect
good will as property in equity cases, and recognize it as
a very important item in considering the value of property in taxation. In some states the good will of a foreign
corporation is even taxable as capital employed within
the state. Because of the vital part that good will plays in
any business venture today, this very intangible property
right has been properly recognized by our courts and
legislatures in other fields of the law. It should behoove
the legislatures and courts to also include loss of good
will as an element of damages when property is taken for
public use.
Id. at 113 (footnotes omitted).
for
*7. Note, Airports-Eminent Domain-Damages-Compensation
Loss to Business, 2 AIR L. 279 (1931).
Purely descriptive.
Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE
L.J. 221 (1931).
Highly idiosyncratic work critical of the rule. Believes normal
8.
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damage theory should ordinarily be controlling in eminent
domain:
Certainly all possible benefit should be derived from the
general law of damages wherever the situations
presented are essentially analogous.
Id. at 246-47 (footnote omitted).
Contains many enlightening observations on the general
procondemnor beliefs of Mr. Nichols, see, e.g., id. at 247, and
Mr. Lewis. See, e.g., id. at 240.
9. McCormick, The Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain.
17 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1933).
Article by Charles T. (Evidence) McCormick highly critical of
the justice of the rule, but prescribing "value to the owner," as
the proper theory to correct the injustice. See id. at 482.
10. Notes, Some Problems of ConsequentialDamages in Condemnation
Proceedings, 28 GEO. L.J. 986 (1940) (student author:
Brennan).
For the courts and legislatures to close their eyes to
this type of damages on the flimsy excuse of the difficulty of measuring them and the fear that excessive
and disproportionate damages might be awarded, and
to make the property owner bear these losses which
nowadays are frequently very serious losses, is too
reminiscent of the antics of the ostrich, and too productive of injustice and unconscionable burdens to be
allowed to continue. The states which have incorporated provisions for compensation for such damages
into their constitutions, and those which achieve a like
result by indirection in allowing such damages to be
considered in determining the diminution in market
value, have recognized the untenability of this position. We should not rest until this position is entirely
vacated, and the realities faced with honesty and
candor.
Id. at 994 (emphasis in original).
*11. Note, Loss of Good Will as Damages in Condemnation Proceedings, 4 Wyo. L.J. 133 (1949) (student author: Van
Benschoten).
Purely descriptive note on Kimball Laundry.
12.
Note, Eminent Domain: Compensationfor Value of Trade Routes
***
Destroyedby Condemnationfor Temporary Use, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
680 (1949) (student author: Kinevan).
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A note on Kimball Laundry. The single attempted defense of
the rule. The defense is based on the assertion that intangibles such as good will are difficult to value. While this
may be true when they are looked at independently, it totally
overlooks the non-speculative nature of valuing the business
as one organic whole.
Does this 'principle of indemnity' require the result
reached by the Court? A close look at the intangibles
"destroyed" reveals that neither good will nor going
concern value can be attributed to any single factor, or to
any number of factors capable of rational segregation
and evaluation. Among other things, they depend upon
managerial and personnel ability, the extent and effectiveness of competition, location, general business conditions and the population factor-contributing
elements defying the crudest empirical appraisal. The
"value" of intangibles founded upon intangibles would
not seem to merit inclusion under the "just compensation" clause. Because of weakness in precedent, the possibly prohibitive expense to the public, and the
speculative and uncertain character of good will or going
concern value, it is submitted that the decision should be
given careful consideration before further application or
extension.
Id. at 684.
13. Dolan, ConsequentialDamages in Federal Condemnation, 35 VA.
L. REV. 1059 (1949).
Article by government lawyer involved in condemnation cases.
Surprisingly, largely descriptive, but misconstrues Monongahela
badly, id. at 1059-60, and recognizes that the no businessdamages rule produces "harsh results." Id. at 1063. Critical of
the internal consistency of General Motors. Id. Prefers "legislative remedy" for the "harsh results." Id. at 1062.
* 14.
Note, Compensation Allowed for Loss of Going-Concern Value in
Temporary Condemnation Case, 1 SYRACUSE L. REv. 308 (1949)
(student author: Chambers).
Largely descriptive, though does say that the rationale of Kimball Laundry "would seem to be applicable to condemnation in
fee cases where it is impossible for the owner to relocate and
reestablish his business." Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
15. Note, Eminent Domain-Compensation-Value of Trade Routes
Lost in Temporary Taking of Laundry Held Compensable Under the
Fifth Amendment, 63 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1949).
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Argues for legislative solution to justice problems of"no business damages" rule.
16. Comment, Consequential Damages and 'Just Compensation" in
Federal Condemnations, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 349 (1950).
Highly critical of rule. Construes Kimball Laundry as overruling
Mitchell sub silentio. Id. at 354.
The cost of paying for property seized for public use
should be shared equally by all the taxpayers. The Fifth
Amendment was not meant to be a subsidy of the community by the individual.
Id. at 355.
**17. Note, Eminent Domain-Determinationof Market Value-"Going Business" as Element of Value, 27 N.D.L. REV. 349 (1951)
(student author: Butler).
Largely descriptive, though strongly asserts that changes in
the rule "probably" ought to be legislative because the rule "is
so universally accepted." Id. at 352.
18. Comment, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 COLUM.
L. REV. 660, 674 (1953).
Critical of rule.
19. Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42
CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1954).
Very critical of rule. Misconstrues Mitchell, then calls it "hard
to defend." Id. at 616. Applauds Kimball Laundry, says that carrying its logic to cases involving fee takings should have the
result that "compensation will be payable for incidental destruction of going concern value in such cases." Id. at 619.
20. Moriarty, What Is "Reasonable Compensation"for "Appropriation ", Under the 1 Oth Article of the Bill of Rights, by a City, of
Land and the Business Thereon for the Purpose of Conducting the
Same Business Thereon?, 41 MASS. L.Q. 24 (1956).
Critical of rule. Emphasis on Monongahela, almost notices the
"direct damages" play. Id. at 25.
21. Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment:
Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
Highly critical of rule. Misconstrues Monongahela badly, then
destroys its own misconstruction. Id. at 69-70.
Urban renewal projects favor particular private enterprises at the expense of less modern and less highly
developed businesses. Under these programs, business
property and residences may be taken through eminent
domain although their physical condition would not justify governmental condemnation of the property by exer-
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cise of police power. Because private developers can
secure valuable sites at prices well below their true
worth, they in effect are subsidized by governments at
the expense of other private property owners. So
viewed, the denial of incidental losses imposes on condemnees a greater burden of financing public improvements; condemned businesses are thus forced to
contribute to the pecuniary success of other profit-making enterprises.

At a minimum, compensation should be awarded for
incidental losses sustained in urban renewal programs or
in any other takings which redound to the direct benefit
of profit-making corporations. Recovery should not,
however, be confined to claims arising in this context.
Ultimately, the public which benefits from improvements
should bear the incidental losses occasioned by any condemnation for which just compensation is required; no
reason appears for placing an inordinate burden on the
individuals whose property is appropriated for the public
benefit.
Id. at 92-93, 96 (footnotes omitted).
22. Note, Urban Renewal. Problems of Eliminating and Preventing
Urban Deterioration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 504 (1959) (stud "t t
authors: Sogg & Wertheimer).
Criticizes rule on "political" grounds.
In view of the increasing number of situations in which a
public agency may take private property and of the very
limited judicial scrutiny applied to such takings, the
traditional measures of compensation paid and the policies underlying them require reappraisal. To make renewal politically more palatable, compensation should
be made for loss of profits, devaluation of property, and
expenses of moving.
Id. at 526 (footnote omitted).
23. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years
of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63.
Criticizes rule if it results in paying, what no owner would take,
for what is lost, (and also, by implication, in failing to pay what
some private party would pay for what is lost).
Thus the normal rule refusing to award the seller in condemnation extra compensation for cost of removal or
loss of business is correct, given the basic assumption of
a willing seller. The fact is, however, that there is almost
never a willing seller in a condemnation suit; otherwise
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there would be no litigation. In fact it may be that these
"costs of sale" have led him not to sell at market price.
If the assumption is that the "average" man would sell at
market, the conclusion that the "unreasonable" man
shall not get more is easy to reach. But what of the situations where it is almost inconceivable that the average
man would sell willingly?
Since market price assumes that a large percentage of rational people would sell at such a price, market price becomes meaningless when most people will not sell. It is
not fair to make one owner sell at a price where it is
highly unlikely that any owner would sell at such a price.
Id. at 96, 98.
24. Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent
Domain, 48 VA. L. REV. 437 (1962).

Wants all consequential damages recoverable under normal
damage theory to be given. Stresses that:
[T]he unfairness resulting from making a few individuals
pay a disproportionate part of the cost of a public
project.
Condemnation activity is intended and expected to
benefit the public or a large segment thereof. Indeed,
without a public purpose, though that phrase is liberally
interpreted, it is improper. Yet under prevailing rules of
compensation a large part of the consequential loss portion of the economic cost of the activity is borne solely by
those on whom it falls. And to this extent the public in
general benefits at the expense of a relative
few. . . .While we concede that the individual must bow
before the inherent right of the sovereign to undertake
the activities that require condemnation, it does not follow that recovery or loss caused thereby must be denied.
On the contrary, the very constitutional provisions which
are interpreted to guarantee compensation for some of
the ensuing losses refute that logic.
Id. at 451 (footnote omitted).
25. Comment, An Act to Provide Compensationfor Loss of Goodwill
Resulting from Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3 HARV. J.

ON

445 (1965).
Generally notes injustice of rule, but looks to a legislative
solution.
26. Slavitt, Inequities and Injustices of Condemnation Acquisitions, 40
CONN. B.J. 11 (1966).
LEGIS.
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Critical of general rule as to the non-recovery of "consequential damages" in general, based on doing "substantial justice."
Id. at 19.
27. Comment, 'just Compensation"for the Small Businessman, 2
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 144 (1966).
This article is the answer to all those who would rely on legislation to solve these problems. Describes the indefensible,
crazy-quilt pattern of legislation then existing (which has not
changed much). Very critical of rule.
[P]resent law results in widespread, predictable hardship. A new standard, whether instituted by the legislatures or the courts, might tend to increase litigation as to
matters of fact. But to the extent that its adoption would
result in a true alignment of law and socio-economic reality, litigation as to matters of law may be substantially
reduced.
It is true that a basic alteration of the traditional law
in favor of more adequate recoveries would destroy the
usefulness of present statistics as a means of projecting
probable condemnation costs. But experience under the
law could be expected to produce statistics just as accurate for this purpose. Moreover, since these new statistics would gauge the actual cost to condemnees, they
would be valuable guides to policy-makers in determining the propriety and reasonable scope of condemnations. The policies of condemnation for public use and
of adequately compensating those whose property is
taken, are not antithetical, but rather complementary.
Some projects may be planned less ambitiously; others
may be postponed. But a balance can be struck which
renders neither policy subservient to the other. The
Sovereign has the power to take for public use; the law
must now fully recognize his duty to compensate justly.
Id. at 162-63.
28. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165 (1967).
Characterizes the rule of no recovery for consequential damage as leading to "violent unfairness" in the redevelopment
setting. Id. at 1255. Dispairs of a judicial response to solve
the problem.
29. Phay, The Eminent Domain Procedure of North Carolina: The
Need for Legislative Action, 45 N.C.L. REV. 587 (1967).
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Highly critical of rule. Misconstrues Monongahela. Id. at 623.
Embraces "value to the owner" as the proper solution.
30.

Klein, Eminent Domain:Judicial Response to the Human Disrup-

tion, 46 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1 (1968).
This article strongly condemns the injustice of the current rule
and proposes a version of value to the owner as the solution.
"[T]he great body of law operating outside the framework of
eminent domain is inconsistent with the law within that framework. . . ." Id. at 18. "[T]here must be some better reason
for a harsh rule than that it is the rule." Id. at 11.
31.

Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and

Business Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L.

REV.

604

(1968).
Highly critical of "no business damages" rule. This article
comes closest to any to date to the "direct damages"
argument.
True value of a going concern and market value of the
individual parts may differ. But the difference apparently
is overlooked by the courts when they attempt to place a
market value on land taken. Although they purport to
treat the state and the property owner as vendee and
vendor bargaining at arm's length in the private market,
the courts generally miss the crucial point that a willing
buyer normally pays for the value of the business as a
going concern, including the value of equipment especially designed for the building in which the business is
housed. The state can force a sale on a reluctant owner
and, through application of arbitrary valuation rules, become, in effect, a strong-arm buyer. Since traditional
condemnation law does not compensate the property
owner for going concern value, the inevitable result is
that the state gets a bargain price.
Id. at 607 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
32. Slavitt, More Inequities and Injustices of Condemnation Acquisitions, 43 CONN. B.J. 89 (1969).
Article reviews many rules and practices of eminent domain
condemnations and shows their injustice. The author points
out that "[t]he nature of a one-man or family-run operation
and the [inadequate] compensation allowed means that many
proprietors of small retail or service establishments are not
able to continue doing business. . . . Most have insufficient
reserves [including credit resources] to absorb the business interruption losses until they are able to relocate elsewhere." Id.
at 102.
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Johnston, 'Just Compensation"for Lessor and Lessee, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 293 (1969).

Article points up the inadequacy of the current approach to
valuation which excludes business losses where "there is considerable disparity between the land's value to the former
owner and its value to the condemnor. .

.

. In the absence of

compulsion, no rational person in the condemnee's position
would accept less than full indemnity." Id. at 300. Article goes
on to evaluate the injustices of some ways in which leaseholds
are compensated. Misconstrues Monongohela and Mitchell. Id.
at 299.
34. Note, The Unsoundness of California'sNoncompensability Rule as
Applied to Business Losses in Condemnation Cases, 20 HASTINGS
L.J. 675 (1969) (student author: Sange).
Savagely critical of rule.
This note has attempted to establish the unsoundness of
judicially imposed restrictions in denying compensation
for lost profits and goodwill by analyzing the weaknesses
of the arguments supporting such restrictions. The interpolation of a distinction between tangible and intangible
property is invalid; the fiction embodied in holding that a
business is not property and, therefore, is not taken is
specious. Non-recognition of the right of customer access is a denial of just compensation that imposes an unfair burden upon the property owner, a burden that
should be borne by the taxpayers as a whole. Use of the
police power to deny compensation for intangible property rights is inconsistent, resulting in unjust losses that
are offensive to the constitution. Finally, the speculation
argument as applied to a taking or a damaging is inapplicable when proper evidence is presented.
Id. at 692 (footnotes omitted).
35. Kanner, When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself"."A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensationfor Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W.L. REV. 57 (1969).
Excoriates the rule of "no business damages" in great detail.
After illustrating its operation on a hypothetical Mr. Green, it
concludes:
Which brings us to the final point: what do we tell
Mr. Green? Do we as attorneys simply tell him what "the
law" is and hide behind the courts' skirts? Do we just
placidly accept the notion that the law ofjust compensation is unjust? (How about: "I know that the result is very
unjust to you, Mr. Green, but that's just compensa-
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tion?") Or, overlooking our traditional status as "officers
of the court," do we cop out by condemning the courts
as callous and unfair? Not a very satisfactory choice, is
it?
Well, what do we tell him? The deplorable fact is
that we have precious little to tell him.
What then is to be done? The obvious answer is
that the courts who have created the present unsatisfactory conditions, must be prevailed upon to formulate
more rational or more just rules.
Id. at 88 (emphasis in original).
36. Bigham, "Fair Market Value, " 'Just Compensation, " and the
Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1970).
Article points out "public dissatisfaction with both the substantive test for damages and the procedures through which
the land is obtained. . . [leaving] a trail of unhappy landowners who have lost all faith in the ability or willingness of government to deal fairly with its citizens." Id. at 65 (footnote
omitted). Author advocates an "indemnity" approach to valuation to rectify the present situation where "compensation is
not allowable for the unwillingness of the owner to part with
his property, the loss of business or future profits, the frustration of the owner's plans, loss of opportunity, or other socalled consequential or indirect damages." Id. at 66 (footnotes
omitted).
37. Happy, Damnum Absque Injuria: When Private Property May
Be Damaged Without Compensation in Missouri, 36 Mo. L. REV.
453 (1971).
Article points to erosion of "just compensation" by such exceptions as "police power," "damages too speculative," etc.
and concludes that "the significant change in the extent and
type of public improvements which are now being undertaken,
accompanied by the broader base of real property ownership,
requires new methods of determining value be instituted to
protect the constitutional guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation." Id. at
470.
38. Comment, Non-Compensable Business Losses in Eminent Domain
Proceedings: A Time for Re-evaluation, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 72
(1972) (student author: Wright).
Very critical of rule.
The current concepts of the measure of compensation
required in the acquisition of a going business by eminent domain merit thorough reexamination. Con-
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demnors presently acquire business property at bargainsale prices. No longer should the courts and legislature
stand complacently idle while actual and measurable
losses remain uncompensated. The small minority directly affected by condemnation should no longer have
to bear disproportionate losses occasioned solely by the
taking of their property for the benefit of the majority.
The losses incurred by business owners are both real and
substantial. Just compensation requires no less than total indemnification for all business losses.
Id. at 89.
39. Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765 (1973).
The article criticizes the rule as harsh, unjust, and Kafkaesque.
The owner is told that he is 'to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied had his property not been taken,' but at the same time he is told that
in his post-condemnation pecuniary position he must absorb without compensation a host of economic losses
arising directly from the taking of his property. He may,
in fact, be economically destroyed by the condemnation,
but that's just too bad; the law-says the Court-is
"harsh" and any remedy should be sought from the legislative branch of the government. If that is constitutionally mandated indemnification then it surely is making its
appearance in a convincing disguise.
Id. at 783 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Misconstrues Monongahela.
Id. at 778.
40. Leary & Turner, The Injustice of 'Just Compensation" to Fixed
Income Recipients-Does Recent Relocation Legislation Fill the
Void?, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1974).

Very critical of the justice of the rule of no consequential
damages.
The notions ofjust compensation, full and perfect equivalence, and making the owner pecuniarily whole are essentially emasculated by judicial holdings that the Fifth
Amendment does not socialize all losses incident to condemnation and that the government must pay only for
what it takes.
Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
41. Slavitt, Just Compensation- Updated, 48 CONN.B.J. 241
(1974).

538

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:483

Critical of rule. Describes recent cases in some states rejecting
rule.
42. Masterman & Tully, Compensation for Business Loss Eminent
Domain Proceedings, B.B.J., May 1976, at 3.
Very critical of rule.
Compensation for business loss resulting from the exercise of the power of eminent domain has traditionally
been denied by the courts. Various reasons have been
advanced for the denial of compensation, the most commonly cited being that constitutional language mandating just compensation for property taken or destroyed
applies only to real property; good will is not "taken" in
an eminent domain proceeding, although the taking may
well destroy the good will; and, the value or diminution
of value of the good will is not susceptible of valuation.
Commentators and critics have castigated and pilloried
these and other attempts to rationalize the unjust denial
of full and fair compensation to condemnees. The consensus has been that the courts have adopted unduly restricted interpretations of the relevant constitutional
language, federal or state.
Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
43. Payne, Compensationfor Business Loss in Eminent Domain Actions, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 63 (1977).

Asserts such compensation is desirable.
44. Payne, A Survey of New Jersey Eminent Domain Law (With Academic Interruptions), 30

RUTGERS

L. REV. 1111 (1977).

Criticizes the rule as based on a flawed view of market theory.
Id. at 1162-63.
*45. Sackman, Business Damages-New Concerns, 1977 INST. ON
PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 255.
Purely descriptive of recent trends toward compensating for
business losses.
46. Comment, The Lessee and Goodwill in an Eminent Domain Proceeding, 8 W. ST. U.L. REV. 47 (1980) (student author:

Rhoades).
Very critical of "no business damages rule."
The essential question to be answered is whether a failure to compensate for goodwill is asking the owner of
private property to bear a disproportionate share of the
cost of public improvement. The author believes the answer to that is yes.
Id. at 48.
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*47.

Note, Eminent Domain-Valuation of Condemned Res - Evidence
of Business Factors Probative of Future Earnings Is Properly Admissible in Condemnation Proceedings Concerning Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity, 52 Miss. L.J. 927 (1982)
(student author: Sledge).
Purely descriptive.
BOOKS

*48.

1 L.

ORGEL, VALUATION

UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 325-28 (2d ed. 1953).
Purely descriptive.
49. E. RAMS, VALUATION FOR EMINENT DOMAIN (1973).
Recognizes the doctrine is unfair to owners, but opposes it,
not on that sentimental ground, but on the ground that it results in a poor market allocation mechanism for wise land use
(another way of saying redevelopment agencies will do things
they shouldn't when they can get the property without paying
for all associated costs).
The consequential loss doctrine has the failing of dissociating the incidence of benefits and costs. In supporting
a doctrine that denies compensation to the owner and
interest holders of a parcel of land, the American judiciary allows the condemning authority to receive the benefits of title without equilibriating costs. The dissociation
caused by this encouragement of "uncosted benefits"
improperly and unwisely allocates land to a particular
use. Because of this lack of wisdom rather than any inequities caused by the doctrine, courts and legislatures
should consider alteration of the doctrine, thereby providing for a rational resolution of land use conflicts.
Id. at 148-49.
50. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 459 n. 1I (1978).
The owner is entitled to the fair value to the owner (not
the worth to the government) at the time of the taking.
See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United
States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973); United States v.
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326, 343 (1893).
See P. Nichols, 3 Eminent Domain § 8.62 et seq. (3d ed.
1974). The body of rules determining which expectations constitute compensable property interests and
which do not, see, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960) (social security expectations not property subject
to compensation under takings law); United States v.
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Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 379-80 (1946) (leasehold
renewal expectation not property), plainly requires reconsideration in light of the broader definition of property interests now employed in the law of procedural due
process. See § 10-9, infra. There seems no good reason
why the broader definition should not be extended to
the takings context.
L. TRIBE, supra, at 459 n.11.
51. 4 P. NICHOLS &J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN (rev. 3d ed. 1983).
Though mainly descriptive, even Nichols, an industry publication for decades edited by a man in charge of condemnations
for a government agency, concedes "unquestionably the rule

sometimes works great hardship" and continues "as a result,
recent trends have been in the direction of finding compensability." Id. § 13.3, at 13-189.

